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EXPLOITATION OF DELEGATED 
AUTHORITY: HOW TO DETER 
PROSECUTORS FROM USING 
"SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE" TO 
DEFEAT THE INTENT OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING LAWS 
INTRODUCTION 
This Comment addresses whether the intent of the federal 
sentencing system is defeated when prosecutors reward high-
level drug offenders with lenient sentences in exchange for 
testimony against less culpable co-conspirators. 
In the mid-1980s, Congress completely overhauled federal 
sentencing policies pertaining to drug-related offenses. In the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 19841 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986,2 Congress enacted sentencing guidelines and 
mandatory-minimum penalty statutes to constrain judicial 
sentencing discretion and curb the inherent disparity that 
plagued indeterminate sentencing.3 In the years since its 
1 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98·473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of IS U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
2 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S. C., 21 U.S. C., and 31 u.S. C.). 
3 See Melissa M. McGrath, Comment, Federal Sentencing Law: Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Determining Departures Based on Defendant's Cooperation Violates Due 
Process, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 321, 324 & n.24 (1990) ("[EJvery day [t]ederal judges mete 
out an unjustifiably wide range of sentences to offenders with similar histories, 
convicted of similar crimes, committed under similar circumstances. . . . These 
disparities ... can be traced directly to the unfettered discretion the law confers on ... 
judges and parole authorities responsible for imposing and implementing . . . 
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implementation, determinate sentencing has limited the 
sentencing discretion of the judiciary but enhanced the role of 
prosecutors in sentencing without resolving the underlying 
disparities.4 
The sentence reforms of the mid-1980s included sentence-
reduction incentives for defendants who provide "substantial 
assistance" by cooperating with law enforcement in the 
investigation or prosecution of a person accused of a criminal 
offense.5 Congress thus delegated to the prosecutor, who 
traditionally has held broad discretion over charging decisions,6 
known study conducted prior to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act, fifty federal 
district court judges in the Second Circuit were given twenty identical case files and 
were asked to indicate what sentence they would impose on each defendant. See 
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT SENTENCING 
STUDY: A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974). The variations in 
the judges' sentences revealed the scope of sentencing disparity. In a bank robbery 
case, the sanctions ranged from a sentence of eighteen years in prison and a $5,000 fine 
to imprisonment of five years and no fine. Id. at 6. In an extortion case, one judge 
sentenced a defendant to twenty years in prison and a $65,000 fine, while another 
imposed a sentence of three years and no fine. Id. at 1-3. 
4 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY 
MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM iii-iv (1991) 
[hereinafter SPECIAL REPORT) (''To the extent that prosecutorial discretion is exercised 
with preference to some and not to others, and to the extent that some are convicted of 
conduct carrying a mandatory minimum penalty while others who engage in the same 
or similar conduct are not so convicted, disparity is reintroduced."). 
5 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1 (2001) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANuAL). Both provisions for substantial assistance allow the district court, upon 
request of the prosecutor, to impose a sentence below the determined penalty range in 
recognition of a defendant's assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another 
person who has committed an offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1. Section 3553(e) allows for a downward departure from 
the applicable mandatory-minimum statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Section 5K1.1 
allows for a downward departure from the applicable sentencing range under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1. See infra 
notes 187-188 and accompanying text for the exact wording of the two substantial-
assistance provisions. 
6 The United States Supreme Court has held on many occasions that charging 
decisions are within the special province of the executive branch. See Heckler v. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985). The Attorney General and the United States 
Attorneys retain "broad discretion" to enforce the nation's criminal laws. Wayte v. 
United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 
368,380 n.11 (1982». They have this latitude because they are designated by statute 
as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to 
"take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; 28 U.S.C. §§ 
501, 540 (1994). As a result, "the presumption of regularity supports" their 
prosecutorial decisions and, ''in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts 
presume that they have properly discharged their official duties." United States v. 
Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. I, 14-15 (1926). In the ordinary case, therefore, 
"so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an 
2
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the exclusive authority to reward defendants who provide 
substantial assistance with favorable departures from 
otherwise applicable mandatory penalties.7 
The substantial-assistance departure has become a 
significant way to avoid the most severe sentences under the 
current federal sentencing scheme.s In theory, the benefits of 
substantial assistance are available to all defendants.9 In 
practice, however, only high-level offenders, those most 
knowledgeable of the drug operation, can take full advantage of 
the departure. lo The combination of harsh mandatory 
penalties for low-level offenders and the substantial-assistance 
departure for high-level offenders has led to a new form of 
disparity in sentencing between offenders with varying levels 
of culpability. 11 
The real potential for disparity is evident in cases like 
United States v. Chisholm. l2 In that case, Clarence Aaron was 
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to 
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rest entirely in his discretion." 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978). 
7 As a condition precedent to departures for substantial assistance, the prosecutor 
must file a motion requesting such a departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1. The court has no authority to sua sponte 
reward a defendant for his substantial assistance with a downward departure from the 
Guidelines and/or the applicable mandatory-minimum statute. See Melendez v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 120, 126 (1996). 
8 Substantial-assistance departures were granted in 24% of all drug cases in 1992; 
27.2% in 1993; 31.7% in 1994; 31.9% in 1995; 30.6% in 1996 and 1997; 30.1% in 1998; 
and 28.5% in 1999. See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion? 
Explaining Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 
1043, 1111 (2001) (citations omitted). In drug-trafficking cases, which do not include 
drug-possession cases and convictions obtained for use of a communications facility to 
commit a narcotics crime, 29.3% of all drug traffickers nationwide received sentence 
reductions for substantial assistance to the government in 1999. See id. at 1117 (citing 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56, 
tbl. 27 (2000». 
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1. 
10 To be sure, not all assistance is considered to be substantial and, therefore, 
worthy of a downward departure. The value of the assistance is evaluated pursuant to: 
(1) the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into 
consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the 
truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by 
the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury 
suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from 
his assistance; and (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.l. Section 3553(e) looks to the same factors to 
determine the quality of a defendant's assistance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
11 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 199,211-13 (1993). 
12 United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304 (11th Cir. 1996). 
3
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convicted for allegedly trafficking nine kilograms of cocaine in 
Mobile, Alabama.13 Mr. Aaron, who had no prior criminal 
record,14 maintained that he did nothing more than introduce 
two parties he knew to be drug dealers.15 At trial, however, he 
was portrayed as a drug kingpin by the testimony of his co-
conspirators.16 Each co-conspirator had prior criminal records, 
and the charges of this conspiracy exposed them to life in 
prison,17 They all entered into plea agreements with the 
prosecutor to testify against Mr. Aaron.1s In return for their 
substantial assistance, the co-conspirators received significant 
leniency in sentencing notwithstanding their relatively greater 
culpability. 19 Mr. Aaron, on the other hand, had no 
information to offer the prosecution because of his limited 
involvement in the drug conspiracy.2o Mr. Aaron was 
sentenced to three life sentences.21 On remand after appeal, 
Mr. Aaron's sentence was reduced to one life sentence.22 Mr. 
Aaron's case is an example of how prosecutors can abuse the 
13 [d. at 305. 
14 See Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999), transcript of 
interview with Clarence Aaron, ("I had to strive my whole life to stay out of trouble. 1 
ain't even had a traffic ticket before."), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpageslfrontlinelshowslsnitchlcaseslaaron.html[hereinafter 
Aaron interview). 
15 [d. ("Yeah, I am guilty of something. I am guilty of hooking up the two parties, 
and I knew that both parties was in some type of drug activities, yes, but about selling 
drugs ... 1 ain't had nothing to do with that."). 
16 [d. (''They had to find somebody [to be) the scapegoat. They had to find somebody 
to ... point the finger at ... to get [their) time reduced, and 1 was that person ... They 
made me seem like I was the kingpin or something, [that) everything that went on, it 
was because of me. Which was not true."). 
17 See Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999), transcript of 
documentary available at http://www.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontlinelshowslsnitchletcl 
script.html [hereinafter Snitch). 
18 Id. 
19 [d. The real organizer and kingpin of the conspiracy, as a result of his 
cooperation with the prosecutor, received a term of imprisonment between twelve and 
fourteen years. Another co-conspirator who testified against Mr. Aaron received a term 
of imprisonment between five and seven years. One co-conspirator did not serve a 
single day and received probation. See id. 
20 [d. ("[WJho was 1 to testify against? I was the last one to be arrested. When 1 got 
arrested, all the guys that was involved in our conspiracy was already cooperating. So 
what do you want me to tell, what they already told? Ain't nothing else I could tell. 
Only people I could have testified against, the guy that was already cooperating at that 
particular time already."). ' 
21 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
22 See Aaron interview, supra note 14. 
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discretion granted to them to administer substantial 
assistance. 
This Comment argues that prosecutors violate separation-
of-powers principles23 when they move for downward 
departures on behalf of kingpins who provide substantial 
assistance in a case against less culpable co-defendants 
because Congress did not authorize such an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.24 In such instances where the intent 
of Congress is defeated, the prosecutor is essentially making 
law and thereby encroaching upon the law-making function of 
Congress.25 To cure this constitutional abuse of prosecutorial 
discretion, the trial court should suppress the testimony of 
high~level conspirators pursuant to the exclusionary rule.26 
23 The separation-of-powers doctrine reflects the central judgment of the Framers of 
the Constitution that, within our political scheme, liberty is best preserved through the 
separation of governmental powers into three coordinate branches, the executive, 
legislative, and judiciary. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,725 (1986). The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that while the Constitution mandates that "each 
of the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the 
control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others," Humphrey's 
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935), the Framers rejected the notion 
that the three branches must be entirely separate and distinct. See Nixon v. Adm'r of 
General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (rejecting as archaic complete division of 
authority among the three branches). Accordingly, our constitutional system imposes 
upon the branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as 
well as independence the absence of which "would preclude the establishment of a 
Nation capable of governing itself effectively." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) 
(per curiam). This flexible approach of checks and balances protects against the 
encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another. See INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). This Comment argues that separation-of-powers 
principles are implicated because the prosecutor essentially makes law when he acts 
contrary to Congress' intent and extends the benefits of substantial assistance to 
kingpin drug dealers at the expense of more minor participants. 
24 See SPECIAL REPORT, at 27 ("[T]he legislative history associated with enactment 
of the drug mandatory minimums suggests that Congress did not set the mandatory 
minimum sentences with the least severe case in mind. All available information 
suggests that the ten- and five-year mandatory minimums were aimed at the high- and 
mid-level managers, respectively."); Jane L. Froyd, Comment, Safety Valve Failure: 
Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 
1471, 1486-87 & n.144 (2000) ("[T]he House Committee on the Judiciary stated that it 
'strongly believes that the federal government's most intense focus ought to be on 
major traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations, who are responsible 
for creating and delivering very large quantities of drugs."') (quoting 132 Cong. Rec. 27, 
193 (1986». 
26 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
26 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,906 (1984) (noting that the exclusionary 
rule is not a personal constitutional right, but rather a judicially-created remedy to 
deter government violations of the Constitution); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960) (''The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its 
purpose is to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
5
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This Comment begins by describing the trial and 
sentencing of Clarence Aaron in Part I. Part II provides a brief 
overview of the history and use of informant testimony. Part 
III discusses the federal sentencing framework and includes an 
analysis of the substantial-assistance motion, the primary 
mechanism through which prosecutors obtain reductions in the 
sentences of defendants who cooperate with law enforcement. 
Part IV focuses on the separation-of-powers challenges made to 
the substantial-assistance motion and why those challenges 
have thus far been fruitless in the federal appellate courts. 
Part IV reveals that the California Supreme Court has reached 
a different result when presented with separation-of-powers 
attacks to similar government-motion requirements under 
California law. Part V argues that Congress intended the most 
severe sentencing laws to apply to kingpin and mid-level drug 
traffickers. When prosecutors use substantial-assistance 
motions to recommend downward departures for kingpin drug 
traffickers at the expense of low-level co-conspirators, Part V 
contends that the prosecution has exceeded its authority to 
enforce the federal sentencing laws, defeated Congress' intent 
and encroached upon Congress' law-making function. To 
remedy the constitutional violation, Part VI proposes that 
courts apply the exclusionary rule and suppress the testimony 
of kingpins introduced against their low-level counterparts. 
I. THE CLARENCE AARON STORY 
In the summer of 1992, Clarence Aaron was twenty-three-
years old, and a promising student athlete at Southern 
University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.27 Mr. Aaron was the 
first in his family to attend college.28 At the time, he 
envisioned graduating from college and then pursuing a career 
in professional football. 29 Later, he wanted to work in 
corporate America, and eventually own his own business.3o 
Those plans, unfortunately, would never materialize. 
effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."). 
27 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
28 [d. 
29 Aaron interview, supra note 14. 
30 [d. 
6
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Marion Watts was a crack-cocaine dealer in Mobile, 
Alabama.31 He purchased powder cocaine by the kilogram, 
converted it into crack cocaine, and then sold it.32 Sometime in 
1992, Watts lost his source of powder cocaine.33 Robert Hines, 
an associate of Watts and one of Mr. Aaron's closest childhood 
friends, called Mr. Aaron and asked him to introduce Watts to 
someone in Baton Rouge who might supply Watts with powder 
cocaine.34 
Although Mr. Aaron had previously made efforts to avoid 
trouble,35 he decided to help his friend. 36 Mr. Aaron drove 
Watts and Hines from Mobile to Baton Rouge and introduced 
them to Elwyn Chisholm.37 Mr. Aaron accepted $1,500 for 
introducing the parties.3s According to Mr. Aaron, he 
contributed nothing else to the conspiracy.39 
Chisholm, through his source in Houston, Texas, provided 
Watts with a significant amount of powder cocaine.40 Watts 
converted the powder cocaine into crack cocaine, and with 
Hines' help, sold it.41 Shortly after their introduction, Watts, 
Chisholm, and Hines became the subjects of a federal 
investigation for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine.42 Mr. 
Aaron's cousin in Mobile was also implicated.43 All had prior 
criminal records, and the potential charges of this conspiracy 
exposed them to life in prison.44 
The United States Attorney's Office in the Southern 
District of Alabama offered prosecutorialleniency to Watts and 
his co-conspirators in exchange for their full cooperation and 
their testimony as to the details of the conspiracy.45 Their 
cooperation with the prosecution led the authorities to Mr. 
31 United States v. Chisholm, 73 F.3d 304, 305 (11th Cir. 1996). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
35 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
36 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
37 See Aaron interview, supra note 14. 
38 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
39 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
40 Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305. 
41 Id. at 305·06. 
42 See Snitch, supra note 17. 
43 See id. 
44 Id. 
45 See id. 
7
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Aaron.46 Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
traveled to Baton Rouge and arrested Mr. Aaron.47 
Mr. Aaron was formally charged along with Chisholm in a 
four-count indictment.48 Upon his arrest, authorities 
attempted to persuade Mr. Aaron to disclose additional 
information about the conspiracy.49 As authorities had 
arrested him last, however, and as he had been the least 
involved in the conspiracy, Mr. Aaron had no information to 
provide that had not already been provided by the other co-
conspirators.5o The prosecution considered Mr. Aaron 
unwilling, rather than unable, to cooperate. 51 Mr. Aaron's case 
was set for jury trial. 52 
At trial, Watts, the prosecution's key witness, provided the 
details of the conspiracy. 53 The testimony of Watts and his co-
conspirators was the only direct evidence linking Mr. Aaron to 
the conspiracy. 54 Contrary to Mr. Aaron's assertion that all he 
had done was introduce his friends in Mobile to Chisholm in 
Louisiana, their testimony portrayed Mr. Aaron as a drug 
kingpin. 55 Watts described two separate drug transactions 
involving Mr. Aaron.56 
46 [d. 
47 See Snitch, supra note 17 (noting that Mr. Aaron told his attorney that FBI 
agents went to his college classroom and pulled him out of the classroom and arrested 
him for possession with intent to distribute cocaine). 
48 See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305. Count I charged conspiracy to possess a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. [d. at 306. In 
count II, Mr. Aaron and Chisholm were charged with possession with the intent to 
distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(I). [d. Count III 
charged a second violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, for attempt to possess a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute. [d. The final count charged criminal forfeiture 
under 21 U.S.C. § 853. [d. 
49 See Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999), transcript of 
interview with J. Don Foster, Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern 
District of Alabama, ("[We] did try to work with Aaron. He would not cooperate .... 
And he was given every opportunity to help himself early on and didn't want to do it. 
He thought he was going to go in there and snow the jury."), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbhlpageslfrontline/showslsnitchlcaseslfoster.html. 
60 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
51 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
52 See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305. 
63 [d. (stating that Watts pleaded guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for 
testimony against Mr. Aaron at trial). 
54 See Snitch, supra note 17 (noting that the case against Mr. Aaron was based 
solely upon the testimony of cooperating individuals). 
55 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
66 See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305-06 (discussing two separate drug transactions in 
which Mr. Aaron was allegedly extensively involved). 
8
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The government introduced no cocaine into evidence. 57 
Nevertheless, the jury found Mr. Aaron guilty of conspiring to 
distribute crack cocaine.58 Under the federal sentencing laws, 
Mr. Aaron was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences 
without the possibility of parole.59 The judge sentenced 
Chisholm to life without parole.60 Watts, notwithstanding his 
role as the conspiracy's organizer and kingpin, in accordance 
with the terms of his plea agreement, received a term of 
imprisonment between twelve and fourteen years.61 Hines 
received a term of imprisonment between five and seven 
years.62 Mr. Aaron's cousin received probation.63 
Following their convictions, Mr. Aaron and Chisholm 
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit.64 The court affirmed their convictions but 
vacated their sentences.65 On remand, the district court 
67 See Snitch, supra note 17. It is true that to obtain a conviction the prosecutor 
need only prove at trial that "a person knowingly or intentionally manufacture[d], 
distribute[dJ, or dispense[d], or possess[ed] with the intent to manufacture, distribute, 
or dispense, a controlled substance; or create [d] , distribute[d], or dispense[d], or 
possess[ed] with intent to distribute or dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1)-(2) (2000). In this regard, merely a detectable amount of drugs is sufficient 
to establish a violation of the substantive drug law. Significantly, however, proof as to 
the amount of drugs relates directly to the extent of punishment under the mandatory-
minimum statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines, both of which use the quantity of 
drugs to establish the level of punishment. See id. § 841(b); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2D1.1. 
68 See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 306. 
69 See Snitch, supra note 17. Although the Snitch documentary reported that Mr. 
Aaron originally received three life sentences, the opinion for the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals stated that Mr. Aaron, pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, was 
sentenced to life without parole. See Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 306. The discrepancy is 
noted for the sake of accuracy. 
60 Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 306. 
61 Aaron interview, supra note 14 (noting that "I think Tino got between 12 and 14 
years ... "). 
62 Id. (stating that ''Robert got five to seven years .. . j. 
63 ld. (noting that "my cousin, he got no time. Probation. Nothing. He just walked 
straight out of the courtroom."). 
64 Chisholm, 73 F.3d at 305. 
66 Id. at 309. On appeal, both Mr. Aaron and Chisholm raised a number of issues. 
See id. at 306. The court rejected all but two arguments. The court first concluded 
that the district court erred by assuming that powder cocaine converts to crack cocaine 
at a one· to-one ratio in determining the quantity of drugs involved in the conspiracy for 
which Mr. Aaron was to be held responsible at sentencing. Id. at 307-08. Second, the 
court held that the district court erred in sentencing Chisholm according to the 
schedule for crack cocaine because the conversion of the powder cocaine into crack 
cocaine was unforeseeable and outside the scope of the criminal activity in which he 
agreed to participate. ld. at 308-09. 
9
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reduced Mr. Aaron's sentence to life imprisonment.66 The court 
reduced Chisholm's sentence to twenty years.67 When one of 
the jurors in Mr. Aaron's case was asked what sentence he 
thought Mr. Aaron deserved, he said a short prison sentence 
would have been appropriate; three to five years at the most.6a 
II. .AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING 
Prosecutorial leniency for defendants who assist law 
enforcement has deep roots in Anglo-American law.69 
Common-law courts have authorized plea-bargaining practices 
for centuries.70 At early common law, accomplices were 
considered competent accusers in felony cases, and the English 
courts either pardoned the accomplice upon the defendant's 
conviction or executed the accomplice upon the defendant's 
acquittal. 71 This practice, known as approvement, was 
discontinued in the 1500s because the likelihood of perjury by 
the accomplice outweighed the probative value of his 
testimony. 72 
Shortly thereafter, however, the practice of granting 
pardons for "turning king's evidence" developed,73 whereby an 
accomplice became eligible for a pardon by testifying fully and 
66 See Aaron interview, supra note 14. 
67 [d. To summarize, Mr. Aaron received life imprisonment. Elwyn Chisholm was 
sentenced to serve twenty years in prison. Marion Watts received between twelve and 
fourteen years in prison. Robert Hines was sentenced to serve between five and seven 
years in prison. Mr. Aaron's cousin was given probation. See Snitch, supra note 17. 
68 See Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999), transcript of 
interview with Willie Jordan who sat on the jury that convicted Mr. Aaron, ("I wouldn't 
have thought of a large number of years, no. Just probably a short sentence .... 
[TJhree to five years, maybe something like that."), available at 
http://www. pbs.org/wgbhlpageslfrontline/showslsnitchlcases/jordan.html. 
69 Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. I, 8 (1992). 
70 Yvette A. Beeman, Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea 
Agreements, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 800, 800 (1987). 
71 [d. (citing 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *235). 
72 Note, Accomplice Testimony Under Conditional Promise of Immunity, 52 COLUM. 
L. REV. 138, 139 (1952) (stating that practice of approvement fell into disuse around 
1500 because conditioning accomplice's pardon upon defendant's conviction was 
considered too conducive to perjury). 
73 See Beeman, supra note 70, at 801 (citing 2 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN *304, and other authorities). In the United States, "turning 
king's evidence" became known as "turning State's evidence." James W. Haldin, Note, 
Toward a Level Playing Field: Challenges to Accomplice Testimony in the Wake of 
United States v. Singleton, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515, 522 (2000) (citing Crawford v. 
United States, 212 U.S. 183, 203 (1909». 
10
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fairly, without regard to whether a conviction was 
subsequently obtained.74 In the treason trials of the 
seventeenth century, the English courts contested this 
practice.75 Notwithstanding its diminished credibility, 
accomplice testimony given in exchange for a pardon was still 
valued as competent evidence.76 
This view prevailed in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries as acknowledged by the major treatises on criminal 
law, evidence, and procedure.77 The courts in the United 
States also adopted the rule of the English treason trials but 
expanded the English tradition by allowing plea bargains for 
sentence leniency as well as total immunity from prosecution.78 
Negotiated agreements between prosecutors and 
cooperators continue to be commonplace.79 While the 
traditional rewards of clemency and immunity still exist, other 
incentives for cooperation have developed including dropped or 
reduced charges, monetary payments, or a commitment to 
recommend a lenient sentence.80 
The presumptive unreliability of accomplice testimony has 
never been disputed.81 Although recognizing that plea 
agreements may encourage perjury,82 courts in the United 
74 See Haldin, supra note 73, at 522 (citing Note, supra note 72, at 139). 
76 See id. 
76 See id. at 522·23. 
77 See id. at 523. 
78 See Beeman, supra note 70, at 801. 
79 See id. (making reference to statistics indicating that ninety percent of all 
criminal defendants plead guilty); Hughes, supra note 69, at 2 (stating that in both 
state and federal criminal prosecutions closely negotiated agreements for immunity 
and lenient plea bargaining in return for cooperation have assumed considerable 
importance); Haldin, supra note 73, at 523 (citing statistics showing that prosecutors 
routinely offer agreements for immunity or leniency to accomplices in exchange for 
testimony). 
so See Haldin, supra note 73, at 523·24 (discussing the various ways in which law 
enforcement can encourage criminal defendants to cooperate). 
81 See Beeman, supra note 70, at 802 ("Accomplice plea agreements tend to produce 
unreliable testimony because they create an incentive for the accomplice to shift blame 
to the defendant or other co·conspirators. Further, an accomplice may wish to please 
the prosecutor to ensure lenient prosecution (or sentencing) in his own case."). 
82 The United States Supreme Court has stated that accomplice testimony is 
suspect and unreliable. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968); On 
Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 
470,495 (1917). See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,22·23 (1967) ("Common 
sense would suggest that [a cooperating defendant] often has a greater interest in lying 
in favor of the prosecution rather than against it, especially if he is still awaiting his 
own trial or sentencing. To think [otherwise would] ... clothe the criminal class with 
more nobility than one might expect ... "). 
11
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States have still found that the value of the information 
obtained through such agreements outweighs the danger of 
unreliability.83 
Furthermore, plea-bargaining agreements are highly 
desirable for practical reasons.84 They facilitate prompt and 
final dispositions of most criminal cases.85 Many criminal 
prosecutions are disposed of without a trial because both the 
prosecutor and the defendant consider the benefits of a plea 
bargain to outweigh the risks and burdens of going to trial. 86 
On one hand, plea-bargaining enhances a criminal defendant's 
chances of receiving a lesser sentence.87 On the other, the plea 
saves the resources of the legal system and allows the 
prosecutor to secure a conviction without expending the time 
and energy required for triaL 88 Due to the overwhelming 
number of defendants and lack of processing resources, plea 
bargaining has necessarily assumed an indispensable role in 
the administration of criminal justice.89 Still, despite its 
practicalities, the "rule of law is invariably sacrificed to the 
rule of convenience" in plea bargaining.90 
Notwithstanding this consequence, the implementation of 
a harsh federal sentencing system in the mid-1980s spawned a 
83 See Jack Finklea, Leniency in Exchange for Testimony: Bribery or Effective 
Prosecution?, 33 IND. L. REV. 957, 960 (2000) (showing that approval of agreements for 
testimony between prosecutors and defendants is further evidenced by the growth and 
scope of the Witness Protection Program, which gives a defendant liberty, money, and 
property in exchange for "truthful" testimony); Haldin, supra note 73, at 523 
("Prosecutors enjoy wide latitude in the type of promises they can make, presumably in 
order to overcome the obstacles that otherwise prevent evidence from reaching the fact 
fmder."). 
84 In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the United States Supreme Court 
stated that "[t]he disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor 
and the accused, sometimes loosely called 'plea bargaining: is an essential component 
of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged." Id. at 
260. Otherwise, "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to a full·scale trial, the 
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number 
of judges and court facilities." Id. 
85 Id. at 26l. 
86 Justin H. Dion, Note, Criminal Law - Prosecutorial Discretion or Contract Theory 
Restrictions? - The Implication of Allowing Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion 
Founded on Underlying Contract Principles, 22 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 149, 161 (2000) 
(citing Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 
1909, 1915 (1992». 
87 Id. (citing U.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5Kl.1). 
88 Id. (citing Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 50, 53·56 (1968». 
89 Id. (citing Alschuler, supra note 88, at 54·55). 
90 Id. (quoting Alschuler, supra note 88, at 85). 
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greater incentive to plea bargain and has led to a steady 
increase in cooperation between criminal defendants and 
prosecutors.91 In order to minimize the severity of the current 
federal sentencing laws and have some chance of receiving a 
reduction in sentence,92 defendants have little choice but to 
provide the prosecution with "substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person."93 
III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING FRAMEWORK 
A. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
The use of informant testimony by the government 
changed dramatically when Congress passed the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984.94 Congress intended the Sentencing 
Reform Act, included as part of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act,95 to address the problem of crime in society. 96 
Public discontent and Congress' dissatisfaction with 
unrestrained judicial discretion and indeterminate sentences 
specifically fueled the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.97 
Before 1987, federal judges had virtually unlimited 
discretion to impose any sentence they considered 
91 See Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 
563-64 (1990) ("While prosecutors may have always welcomed the assistance of 
snitches, tougher federal sentencing laws have led to a significant increase in 
cooperation as more defendants try to provide 'substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person: to have some chance of receiving a 
significant sentence reduction."). To support his argument, Professor Weinstein points 
to data of cooperation rates collected and analyzed by the Sentencing Commission. See 
id. at 563 n.2. "In 1989 ... only 3.5% of the cases involved substantial assistance 
departures. In 1990 the number climbed to 7.5%, and ... move[d] up to 11.9% in 1991, 
15.1% in 1992 and 16.9% in 1993. In 1994 the figure reached 19.5% ... , 19.7% in 1995 
and 19.2% in 1996." See id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 39, fig. G (1996». 
92 ld. at 564. 
93 ld. 
94 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S. C.). 
95 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1976 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.). 
96 SPECIAL REPORT, at ii. 
97 See Karen Bjorkman, Note, Who's the Judge? The Eighth Circuit's Struggle with 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Section SKI. I Departure, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 731, 
735 (1992) ("In the early 1960s the increasing crime rate spurred growing concern and 
criticism of indeterminant sentencing. Individualized sentencing was criticized as the 
public became aware of discrimination and due process violations."). 
13
Hrvatin: Substantial Assistance
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
130 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:2 
appropriate.98 This indeterminate sentencing system99 
reflected Congress' desire to rehabilitate defendants, rather 
than punish them.loo Indeed, few constraints determined what 
judges could or should consider when sentencing, except the 
maximum sentence imposed by law.10l Judges could utilize any 
factors they deemed relevant to sentencing a defendant. lo2 In 
addition to their great discretion in sentencing, judges had 
statutory authority to suspend almost all sentences. loa Finally, 
the availability of parole prior to the Sentencing Reform Act 
created even greater uncertainty in sentencing, for the actual 
time served by a defendant was likely to be far less than the 
sentence imposed.lo4 
Broad discretion led to non-uniform sentencing throughout 
the federal system.105 This disparity was perceived as being 
98 See Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of Judicial 
Revolt on "Substantial Assistance" Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial 
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 9 (1999) ("The characteristic feature of criminal 
sentencing in federal court before November 1987, when the Guidelines went into 
effect, was the virtually absolute discretion enjoyed by sentencing judges."). 
99 In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), Justice Hugo Black said that 
indeterminate sentencing is "[a] prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the 
punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime .... The belief no longer 
prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for identical punishment 
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender." Id. at 247. 
100 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) C'[l]ndeterminate 
sentencing [was] based on [the] conceptO of the offender's possible, indeed probable, 
rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to rehabilitate the inmate and 
thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume criminal activity upon his return to 
society."); Dion, supra 86, at 163-64 (''Th[e] indeterminate sentencing system 
exemplified Congress' desire to rehabilitate defendants, rather than punish them. 
Congress referred to this system of sentencing as the 'rehabilitation model."') (footnotes 
omitted). 
101 See David Fisher, Fifth Amendment - Prosecutorial Discretion Not Absolute: 
Constitutional Limits on Decision Not to File Substantial Assistance Motions, 83 J. 
CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 744, 745 (1993) ("Prior to the passage of the Sentencing 
Reform Act, federal judges enjoyed extremely broad discretion in sentencing. A judge 
could impose any sentence she thought was proper as long as it did not exceed the 
statutory maximum."). 
102 Factors included the offender's personality, social background, motivation for 
criminal conduct, and the potential for effective correctional treatment. See Bjorkman, 
supra note 97, at 734-35. 
103 See Weinstein, supra note 91, at 572 n.30. 
104 See SPECIAL REPORT, at 15 ("[WJhile judges wielded tremendous sentencing 
discretion, the potency of their sanction was often severely diluted by a parole 
commission that later resentenced the defendant according to its own set of rules.,,). 
106 See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines: 
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1689 (1992) 
("In a system without acknowledged starting points, measuring rods, stated reasons, or 
principled review, unwarranted (or at least unexplained) disparity and 
14
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unfair and in conflict with the notion that similarly situated 
defendants should be treated equally. lOG To combat the 
disparity, many legal scholars and lawyers concluded that a 
uniform system of sentencing guidelines was needed.107 The 
climate was right for sweeping federal sentencing reform. lOB 
The Sentencing Reform Act was formulated with the 
overarching purpose to enhance the ability of the criminal 
justice system to combat crime through an effective and fair 
sentencing scheme.109 To accomplish this goal, Congress 
identified three objectives. l1O 
Congress first sought certainty and honesty In 
sentencing.111 By abolishing parole and the indeterminate-
sentencing structure, the Sentencing Reform Act eliminated 
the need for federal judges, when rendering sentence, to 
contemplate the future actions of the Parole Commission. ll2 
Determinate sentencing would allow judges to impose an 
appropriate sanction without concern that the sentence would 
be reduced significantly at a later date through parole 
release. 113 In this way, the public would also feel that the 
judge's sentence would represent the sentence that the offender 
would serve.114 
Second, Congress sought uniformity in sentencing such 
that similar defendants convicted of similar offenses would 
receive similar sentences.ll5 Congress significantly reduced the 
ability of judges to impose very different sentences by enacting 
guidelines that limited the range of possible imprisonment 
dis proportionality seemed to flourish."). 
106 Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 105, 114 (1994) [hereinafter Lee I). 
107 Michael S. Gelacek, et al., Departures Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: 
An Empirical and Jurisprudential Analysis, 81 MINN. L. REV. 299, 307 (1996). 
108 See William W. Wilkins, Jr., et at, Competing Sentencing Policies in a "War on 
Drugs" Era, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 305, 309·10 (1993) (noting that Congress began 
to express broad concern about unwarranted disparity in sentencing in the mid·1970s, 
and that after several failed attempts to completely revise the federal criminal code, 
the long· sought Sentencing Reform Act, included in the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984, was signed into law by President Ronald Reagan). 
109 [d. 
110 [d. 
111 SPECIAL REPORT, at 16. 
112 [d. 
113 Wilkins et at, supra note 108, at 310. 
114 [d. 
115 SPECIAL REPORT, at 16. 
15
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sentences to a maximum variance of six months or twenty-five 
percent for similarly situated defendants.116 
Congress finally sought proportionality or just punishment 
in sentencing by creating a system that recognized the 
differences in defendants and their offenses and that provided 
appropriate sentences with those differences in mind.ll7 
To achieve these three objectives, the Sentencing Reform 
Act provided for the formation of the United States Sentencing 
Commission as an independent, permanent agency in the 
judicial branch.118 The overriding mandate to the Sentencing 
Commission was to determine the appropriate types and 
lengths of sentences for more than 2,000 offenses by 
establishing a uniform and comprehensive set of sentencing 
guidelines for all federal courtS.119 
Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission created the 
Sentencing Guidelines and submitted to Congress for review its 
first set of guidelines on April 13, 1987.120 On November 1, 
1987, after six months of review, the first edition of the 
Sentencing Guidelines became law.121 Full nationwide 
impleme~tation of the Sentencing Guidelines did not begin, 
however, until late January 1989.122 
Between 1987 and 1989, more than 300 constitutional 
challenges to the Guidelines and the Sentencing Commission 
itself pre6luded full nationwide implementation.123 In January 
1989, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission and its 
116 [d. 
117 [d. 
118 [d. The Sentencing Commission consists of seven voting members (one of whom 
is the Chairman) appointed by the President and confll'med by the Senate. See 28 
U.S.C. § 991(a) (1998). The President also appoints one non·voting member, and the 
Attorney General or hislher designee sits as a non·voting, ex officio member. See id. 
No more than four members can be of the same political party and at least three 
members must be federal judges. See id. The other members can include judges and 
non·judges who have demonstrated expertise in the criminal justice area. See id. The 
Chairman and other members of the Commission are subject to removal by the 
President "only for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause 
shown." [d. Each voting member serves for six years and may not serve more than two 
full terms. See 28 U.S.C. § 992(a). 
119 SPECIAL REPORT, at ii. 
120 [d. at 17. 
121 [d. 
122 [d. at ii. 
123 SPECIAL REPORT, at ii. 
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Guidelines by finding that Congress validly delegated its 
legislative power to the Sentencing Commission and did not 
violate the separation-of-powers doctrine.124 
The Sentencing Guidelines instituted a detailed system for 
calculating a convicted defendant's sentence on a chart known 
as the Sentencing Table, in which the severity of the crime 
committed is graphed on one axis and is then juxtaposed 
against the offender's criminal history on another axis. 125 The 
sentencing range for a particular defendant is the intersection 
of the two axes.126 The vertical axis that determines the 
severity of the offense is comprised of forty-three levels.l27 The 
horizontal axis is comprised of six criminal-history 
categories.l28 Movement along the criminal-history axis is 
determined by prior convictions,129 while movement on the 
offense-level axis is determined by the nature of the crime as 
well as any aggravating or mitigating factors.13o Accordingly, 
the Guidelines take into account both the seriousness of the 
offense, including relevant offense characteristics, and 
important information about the offender, such as the 
offender's role in the offense and prior record.131 
124 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390 (1989). 
125 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2001). 
126 See id. (expressing respective sentencing ranges in terms of months). 
127 See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. (noting that the criminal history portion of the Sentencing Table has six 
categories, each covering a range of two to three criminal-history points). 
130 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A. In drug-trafficking cases, a 
defendant's base-offense level is determined according to the type and quantity of drug 
at issue as provided in the Drug Quantity Table. See id. at § 2Dl.1(c). The base-
offense level can then be adjusted to more specifically reflect the nature of the criminal 
conduct. See id. at § 3Alo1-El.l. For example, if the court finds that the offense 
committed was a hate crime, the defendant's offense level is increased by three levels. 
See id. at § 3Al.1(a). A crime committed upon a vulnerable victim warrants an 
increase of two levels. See id. at § 3Al.l(b)(lH2). The defendant's aggravating role in 
the offense justifies an increase in the base offense of two to four levels. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3Bl.l(a)-(c). Downward adjustments are 
similarly available. Where the defendant played a mitigating role in the offense, a 
downward adjustment of two to four levels is possible. See id. at § 3Bl.2(a)-(b). If the 
defendant accepts personal responsibility for the offense, his offense level can be 
further adjusted downward by two levels. See id. at § 3El.l(a)-(b). It is important to 
note that adjustments to a sentence are not the same as departures from a sentence. 
Adjustments are made in the determination of the offense level, while departures are 
made after the defendant's appropriate guideline range is calculated. See id. at § 
1B1.1. 
131 SPECIAL REPORT, at 19. 
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Once the intersection of the offense level and the criminal 
history is determined, the court is presented with a narrow 
range of months within which to sentence the defendant.132 If 
the judge sentences the defendant within this range, the 
sentence is not subject to appellate review unless the judge 
makes a mistake in calculation or the sentence is imposed in 
violation oflaw.133 
The court can depart from the applicable sentencing range 
only when it finds "that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result 
in a sentence different from that described."134 If a judge 
departs from the applicable guideline range and imposes a 
sentence that is higher or lower than the range, the judge must 
132 Id. at 23. 
133 See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) (2000). 
134 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b». 
Before an upward or downward departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case 
must be found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996) (setting forth 
the framework a sentencing court should consider in deciding the appropriateness of a 
departure). To assist courts, the Sentencing Commission did identify some of the 
factors that were not adequately considered when formulating the Guidelines, and 
which, in effect, can take a case out of the ''heartland'' of the sentencing range. See 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (stating that only courts can determine 
whether unique circumstances warrant departure because the Guidelines cannot list or 
analyze all possible scenarios). Interestingly, the Sentencing Guidelines "place 
essentially no limit on the number of potential factors that may warrant a departure." 
Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137 (1991). A court, for instance, may increase 
. the sentence if the offense resulted in death, significant physical injury, or if the victim 
suffered serious psychological injury. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
5K2.1-2.3. A downward departure may be appropriate if the victim's wrongful conduct 
contributed significantly to provoking the offense. See id. at § 5K2.10. If the crime was 
committed to avoid a perceived greater harm, or because of serious coercion, blackmail, 
or duress, even if not amounting to a complete defense, a downward departure may be 
appropriate. See id. at § 5K2.11-2.12. A court may depart downward if the defendant 
committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity. 
See id. at § 5K2.13. Once a court has decided to depart, there is generally no formula 
governing the extent of the departure. See Patti B. Saris, Below the Radar Screens: 
Have the Sentencing Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027, 1042 (1997). The extent of the departure need only be 
reasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). There are certain factors, however, that never 
can be the bases for departure, including age; educational and vocational skills; mental 
and emotional conditions; physical condition; employment record; family or community 
ties; race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status; military 
record; or lack of guidance as a youth. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
5H1.1-1.6,1.10-1.12. 
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demonstrate that the departure has a permissible basis. l35 
Hence, the Guidelines constrain the sentencing discretion of 
federal judges by requiring them to impose sentences within 
calculated and limited guideline ranges. l36 
The Guidelines, in effect, replaced a discretionary system 
of judicial sentencing with a system of mandatory sentencing 
that is determined in large part by the prosecutors.l37 
Although prosecutors have always played a significant role in 
sentencing, the Guidelines substantially enhanced their role 
and discretion in four ways.l3S 
First, the Guidelines embody a "charge-offense based" 
approach to sentencing, and since prosecutors control what to 
charge, they essentially control the ultimate sentence. l39 
Second, the control over what to charge gives the prosecutor a 
greater advantage in plea-bargaining, from which sentence 
determinations are regularly made to the general exclusion of 
the sentencing judge.l40 Third, during the sentencing phase of 
trial, the prosecutor may introduce relevant conduct to enhance 
a defendant's sentence, which need only be proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence. l4l Finally, if a defendant 
provides substantial assistance, only the prosecutor can file a 
135 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). If a judge chooses to depart from an applicable guideline 
range, the standard of review is a stringent one. Discretionary refusals to depart are 
not subject to appeal. Nor can a defendant appeal the degree of a downward departure. 
See Antoinette Marie Tease, Downward Departures for Substantial Assistance: A 
Proposal for Reducing Sentencing Disparities Among Codefendants, 53 MONT. L. REV. 
75,77-78 (1992). 
136 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the 
Federal Prosecutor's Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 
RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 201 (1997) [hereinafter Lee II] (stating that the Guidelines 
constrain the sentencing discretion of federal district·court judges by requiring them to 
calculate an applicable guideline range before imposing sentence). 
137 See Paul M. Secunda, Note, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing 
Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1997) (stating that the 
creation of the Guidelines to rein in the discretion of the federal judges has resulted in 
the vast accretion of prosecutorial discretion). 
138 See id. at 1273-78 (discussing four ways in which the Sentencing Guidelines 
dramatically expanded the prosecutor's role in sentencing). 
139 Id. at 1273-74 (citing Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadows of the 
Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1502 (1993». The prosecutor's decision as to what 
facts to charge determines a defendant's base·offense level under the Guidelines, and, 
hence, the likely extent of punishment. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
IB1.1(aHc). . 
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motion for downward departure.142 Hence, a significant portion 
of the constitutionally mandated sentencing authority 
traditionally held by judges was transferred to prosecutors.143 
B. MANDATORy-MINIMUM PENALTIES AND How THEY 
INTERACT WITH THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Simultaneous to the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act 
and the development and implementation of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986.144 The Act included criminal statutes that imposed 
mandatory-minimum sentences for drug crimes and crimes of 
violence involving firearms.145 In particular, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act established a system of mandatory-minimum 
sentences for drug-trafficking offenses in which the minimum 
penalty was tied to the amount of drugs involved in the 
offense.146 The Act's focus on the quantity of drugs was a new 
one, for prior drug legislation "did not distinguish drug 
traffickers by the quantities of drugs they were responsible for 
selling or smuggling."147 Congress, however, believed that the 
amount of drugs involved in any particular offense was an 
indicator of both the harm to society as well as the offender's 
culpability.148 
Mandatory-minimum statutes were passed as a dramatic 
and popular way to address some of the same perceived 
sentencing evils that served as the motivation for the 
142 [d. (citing u.s. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1). 
143 See Bennett Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 393, 418-19 
(1992) (stating that the Guidelines have restricted the sentencing discretion of judges 
and produced a corresponding enhancement in the prosecutor's discretion to make 
charging decisions and to force persons to cooperate); Lee II, supra note 136, at 234-35 
(arguing that recent cases make clear that the prosecutor has the ability to determine 
whether a court will be able to exercise discretion and depart from the prescribed 
sentencing range). 
144 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as 
amended is scattered sections of 18 U.S. C., 21 U.S. C., and 31 U.S. C.). 
145 See SPECIAL REPORT, at 6-11 (tracing the development of mandatory-minimum 
sentencing back to as early as 1790, when Congress established such penalties for 
capital offenses). 
146 [d. at 10. 
147 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1486 & n.143 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 10-11 (1986». 
148 [d. at 1486 (citing U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 4 (1997». 
20
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Sentencing Reform Act. 149 The public's heightened concern 
over the devastating effects of drug addiction and the alarming 
rate at which drugs were flowing into the United States raised 
congressional awareness, urging a legislative response. 150 
Congress took aim at the judiciary and what it believed to be 
the unduly lenient sentencing practices of federal judges.151 
Too often, major drug traffickers reappeared quickly on the 
streets after prosecution and conviction.152 In an effort to stop 
this "revolving door," Congress turned to statutorily mandated 
sentencing provisions for drug offenses.153 By enacting these 
penalty provisions, Congress sought to expose serious drug 
offenders to lengthy and mandatory terms of imprisonment.154 
The message to the federal judiciary as well as the public was 
that society would no longer tolerate the proliferation of illegal 
drugs. 155 These statutes, however, were enacted without 
serious debate and without considering their compatibility with 
the Guidelines.156 In a very real way, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
was the product of public hysteria and a responsive political 
whirlwind. 157 
149 Phillip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety 
Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1877·78 (1995). 





155 Wilkins et at, supra note 108, at 315. 
156 Oliss, supra note 149, at 1878. 
157 Eric Sterling, now president of the Criminal Justice Foundation, was counsel to 
the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime and took an active part in 
formulating the mandatory.minimum statutes. See Snitch, supra note 17. Mr. 
Sterling's view on how the Anti·Drug Abuse Act came about is revealing. 
The work that I was involved in, in enacting these mandatory sentences, is 
probably the greatest tragedy of my professional life. These laws came about in 
an incredible conjunction between politics and hysteria. It was 1986. Tip O'Neill 
comes back from the July 4th district recess, and everybody's talking about the 
death of the Boston Celtics pick, Len Bias. That's all his constituents are talking 
to him about. And he has the insight, "Drugs. It's drugs. I can take this issue 
into the election." He calls the Democratic leadership together in the House of 
Representatives and says, "I want a drug bill. I want it in four weeks." And it 
set off kind of a stampede. I mean, everybody started trying to get out front on 
the drug issue .... [Elvery committee, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Interior 
and Insular Affairs ... not just the Judiciary Committee, Foreign Affairs, Ways 
and Means, Agriculture .... Everybody's got a piece of this out there ... fighting 
to sort of get their ... face on television talking about the drug problem .... 
[T]hese mandatories came in the last couple days before the [clongressional 
recess, before they were all going to race out of town and, you know, tell the 
21
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As applied, statutory mandatory minimums require judges 
to Impose no less than the specified sentence upon 
conviction. l58 Specifically, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
reintroduced five-, ten-, and twenty-year mandatory-minimum 
sentences for persons convicted of trafficking in, importing, or 
possessing specified amounts of controlled substances. l59 The 
Act subjects large-scale drug dealers or "kingpins" to a ten-year 
mandatory-minimum sentence for a first offense and a twenty-
year sentence for a second conviction of the same offense. l6o 
Mid-level dealers in the drug-distribution chain receive a 
mandatory-minimum penalty of five years for a first offense 
and a ten-year minimum sentence for a second conviction of the 
same offense. l6l Nothing in the Act's legislative history 
suggests that Congress intended these harsh mandatory-
minimum sentences to apply inversely to low-level participants 
in drug crimes. l62 
[d. 
voters about what they're doing to fight the war on drugs. No hearings, no 
consideration by the federal judges, no input from the Bureau of Prisons. I 
mean, even DEA didn't testify .... [T]he whole thing was kind of cobbled 
together with sort of chewing gum and baling wire. Numbers are picked out of 
air. And we see what these consequences are of that kind of legislating. 
158 See Weinstein, supra note 91, at 573. The principal statute declares that "it shall 
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally (1) to manufacture, distribute, or 
dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled 
substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute 
or dispense, a counterfeit substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000). The penalty 
provisions are set forth in section 841(b) according to the type and quantity of the 
controlled substance involved in the offense. See id. § 841(b). Section 841(b) is entitled 
"Penalties" and states that "any person who violates [section 841(a)] shall be sentenced 
[as section 841(b) prescribes.]" [d. 
159 Weinstein, supra note 91, at 572. 
160 See SPECIAL REPORT, at 10. "The Act's legislative history suggests that Congress 
expected that those typically subject to the ten·year mandatory minimum would be 
large· scale drug dealers (called 'major traffickers)." Wilkins et aI., supra note 108, at 
316 & n.66 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11·12, 16·17 (1986». 
161 "The [Act's] legislative history suggests that the five·year mandatory minimum 
would apply to mid·level drug dealers (called 'serious traffickers)." Wilkins et aI., 
supra note 108, at 316 & n.67 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 17·18 
(1986». 
162 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. But see Edward J. Tafe, Comment, 
Sentencing Drug Offenders in Federal Courts: Disparity and Disharmony, 28 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 369, 379 (1994) ("[T]his sentencing scheme also targeted those operating at lower 
retail levels of the distribution chain. Street· level traffickers were considered 
appropriate targets of the [mandatory· minimum] statute[s] 'because they keep the 
street markets going."' (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1986». No 
one disputes that all individuals, even those operating on the lower retail levels of the 
distribution chain, trafficking in large quantities of drugs should come within the 
purview of the most severe mandatory-minimum statutes. As the United States 
22
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss2/2
2002] SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE 139 
The Act's approach of corresponding specific sentences to 
relative drug quantities was also incorporated into the 
Sentencing Guidelines.163 Although the Sentencing Reform Act 
was enacted before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the Guidelines 
were not promulgated until 1987.164 The Sentencing 
Commission referred to the penalty structure of the 1986 Act to 
establish the penalty ranges for drug offenses under the 
Guidelines. 165 In essence, mandatory-minimum sentences 
serve as the floor for sentencing ranges under the Guidelines, 
either equaling or exceeding the minimum sentences specified 
in section 841(b).166 
Mandatory-minimum sentences, however, still "trump the 
guideline ranges."167 Mandatory provisions force courts to 
impose specific penalties for certain drug crimes.16S Even if the 
Guidelines place the low end of the sentencing range below the 
mandatory minimum, the court cannot venture below the 
mandatory-minimum sentence unless the prosecutor files a 
Supreme Court explained in Chapman u. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991): 
Congress adopted a "market-oriented" approach to punishing drug trafficking, 
under which the total quantity of what is distributed, rather than the amount of 
pure drug involved, is used to determine the length of the sentence. To 
implement that principle, Congress set mandatory minimum sentences 
corresponding to the weight of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable 
amount of' the various controlled substances, . . . It intended the penalties for 
drug trafficking to be graduated according to the weight of the drugs in whatever 
form they were found - cut or uncut, pure or impure, ready for wholesale or 
ready for distribution at the retail level. Congress did not want to punish retail 
traffickers less severely, even though they deal in smaller quantities of the pure 
drug, because such traffickers keep the street markets going. 
Id. at 461 (citations omitted). Some minor participants, however, are indeed less 
culpable and exposing these lower-level co-conspirators to penalties intended for 
kingpin drug traffickers defeats congressional intent. The result, as seen in Clarence 
Aaron's case, is inherently unjust. 
163 Wilkins et aI., supra note 108, at 319-20 ("[T]he drug guidelines were based 
principally upon the mandatory penalty structures provided by the 1986 Act."). 
164 SPECIAL REPORT, at 17. 
165 Tafe, supra note 162, at 379. Section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines sets a 
range of sentences for violations of section 841. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANuAL § 2D1.1. "The drug quantity tables in [section) 2D1.1 listD the sentencing 
ranges for offenses involving specified amounts of various proscribed substances and 
followD a strictly proportional pattern interpolated from the mandatory minimum 
sentences of [section) 841(b)." Tafe, supra note 162, at 379 (citing Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not 
Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 872 (1992». 
166 Tafe, supra note 162, at 379-80. 
167 Saris, supra note 134, at 1035. 
168 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1484. 
23
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motion for a departure based on substantial assistance.169 
Hence, while a defendant's sentence may have reflected certain 
downward adjustments for mitigating circumstances under the 
Guidelines,17o mandatory mimmums nullify these 
adjustments. 171 
In this way, mandatory-minimum penalties do not fit 
neat,ly into the Sentencing Commission's sentencing scheme.172 
The Sentencing Guidelines are structured so that a small 
change in a particular factor relevant to sentencing, like the 
seriousness of the offense or important information about the 
offender, results in only an incremental change in the 
applicable sentence range under the Guidelines.173 Mandatory 
minimums, on the other hand, operate contrary to the 
Guidelines by creating sharp differences in sentences among 
defendants who fall just below the threshold of a mandatory 
minimum and those whose criminal conduct subjects them to 
the mandatory penalty.174 
169 Id. See also Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 122 (1996) (holding that 
departure below the minimum of the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines 
does not also permit departure below statutory minimum sentence). 
170 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
171 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1484. 
172 Id.; Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States 
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain 
and Effective Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 194 (1993) (''While the 
Commission has consistently sought to incorporate mandatory minimums into the 
guidelines system in an effective and reasonable manner, in certain fundamental 
respects, the general approaches of the two systems are inconsistent.") (citations 
omitted). 
173 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1484. 
174 Id. Although not the focus of this comment, mandatory·minimum statutes have 
come under additional attack since the United States Supreme Court held in Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that 
increases the prescribed statutory maximum penalty to which a defendant is exposed 
must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 490. 
Nearly all of the circuit courts have found that the fact of drug quantity is the kind of 
fact that must be submitted to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt when 
the amount of drugs exposes a defendant to an increased penalty beyond the statutory 
maximum allowable under the facts as found by the jury. See, e.g., United States v. 
Thomas, 274 F.3d 655,663·64 (2d Cir. 2001) (en bane); United States v. Vasquez, 271 
F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2001) (en bane); United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 157 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, No. 01·6398 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2001); United 
States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1177 
(2001); United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 542-43 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 
U.S. 1056 (2001); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 820, 824-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
122 S.Ct. 79 (2001); United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933-34 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026 (2000); United States v. Nordby, 225 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th 
Cir. 2000), overruled by United States v. Buckland, 277 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2002) 
24
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In addition to the statutory mandatory-minimum 
provisions, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 included two 
amendments that received little comment at the time the Act 
was passed, but have contributed significantly to the lure of 
informant testimony.175 The first amendment authorized 
judges to reduce a defendant's sentence below the mandatory 
minimum to reflect the defendant's cooperation, but only on 
motion of the government.176 The second amendment revised 
the statutory directive of the Sentencing Reform Act and 
authorized the Sentencing Commission to create sentence-
reduction incentives that allow prosecutors to move for 
reductions in a sentence below the guideline range for 
offenders who assist in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person committing a criminal offense. 177 By holding 
out the potential for sentence mitigation, these amendments 
solidified the already strong incentives for criminal defendants 
to make cooperation agreements with the government. 178 
With the passage of the Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act in 
1988,179 Congress continued to target drug crimes by modifying 
the mandatory penalties for those defendants involved in drug-
trafficking conspiracies.l80 As a result, the mandatory-
(en banc); United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Rogers, 228 F.3d 1318, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by United 
States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc); United States v. Fields, 
251 F.3d 1041, 1043·44 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Defendants have since taken Apprendi and 
argued that sections 841(b)(1)(A) & (B), the two principle and most severe mandatory 
penalty provisions, are facially unconstitutional. The circuit courts have thus far 
rejected the argument. See, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 272 F.3d 622, 623 (3rd Cir. 
2001) (per curiam); United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 232-33 (4th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 581 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 
1045 (2001); United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 256 n.6 (6th Cir. 2001); United 
States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 203 (2001); 
United States v. Woods, 270 F.3d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 2001); Buckland, 277 F.3d at 1177; 
United States v. Cernobyl, 255 F.3d 1215, 1216 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300,1311 n.16 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2535 (2001). 
176 Weinstein, supra note 91, at 573 & n.34 (''The statutes which fostered widespread 
cooperation ... were passed as a pair of amendments buried deep in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986. There was no debate in either chamber and no mention of the 
change appears in any of the reports or other legislative history of that act ... "). 
176 Id. at 573 & n.35 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994». 
177 Id. at 573 & n.36 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (1994 & West Supp. 1998». 
178 Id. 
179 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat. 4377 
(codified as amended at 21 U.8.C. §§ 846, 963 (1994». 
180 SPECIAL REPORT, at 10; Hatch, supra note 172, at 193 ("In 1988, Congress cast an 
even larger net over drug offenses at different levels of the drug distribution chain by 
applying mandatory minimum penalties to conspiracies to commit certain offenses .. 
25
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minimum penalties previously applicable to drug-trafficking 
offenses became applicable to conspiracies to commit these 
substantive offenses. lSI Although the range of culpability 
varies among co-conspirators, this change increased the 
likelihood that the applicable mandatory penalties could apply 
equally to the kingpin drug dealer and the mid- or low-level co-
conspirators. lS2 Under the laws of conspiracy, low-level 
dealers, middlemen and higher-up organizers could all be held 
responsible for the same quantity of drugs flowing through the 
conspiracy.lS3 
The changes in sentencing of the mid-1980s had a serious 
impact on the choices available to federal criminal 
defendants.ls4 Congress, however, did not completely close the 
door on defendants charged with drug crimes. By providing 
law enforcement with substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person, a defendant can 
receive significant leniency from otherwise applicable guideline 
ranges and mandatory-minimum penalties. lS5 Accordingly, 
this benefit provides defendants with a self-serving incentive to 
testify falsely against others.lS6 
.") (footnote omitted). 
181 SPECIAL REPORT, at 10. The pertinent amendment was codified at 21 U.S.C. § 
846 and provides that: "Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense 
defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for 
the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21 
U.S.C. § 846 (2000). 
182 SPECIAL REPORT, at 10. 
183 See Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 212-13. 
184 Weinstein, supra note 91, at 578. 
185 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5Kl.l. 
186 See Lee II, supra note 136, at 207 ("[T]he incentive to lie is exacerbated ... 
because cooperation is the primary door through which defendants can receive 
sentencing leniency."). In a lecture to federal prosecutors, Stephen S. Trott, the chief of 
the Criminal Division of the Justice Department during the Reagan Administration 
and now a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, had the 
following to say about informant testimony: 
Criminals are likely to say and do almost anything to get what they want, 
especially when what they want is to get out of trouble with the law. This 
willingness to do anything includes not only truthfully spilling the beans on 
friends and relatives, but also lying, committing perjury, manufacturing 
evidence, soliciting others to corroborate their lies with more lies and double-
crossing anyone with whom they come into contact, including-and especially-
the prosecutor. 
Mark Curriden, The Informant Trap: Secret Threat to Justice (pt. 1) NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 
1995, atAl. 
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C. DOWNWARD DEPARTURE THROUGH SUBSTANTIAL 
AsSISTANCE 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 expressly included sentence-reduction 
incentives for defendants who provide substantial assistance in 
the investigation or prosecution of another person committing a 
criminal offense. For its part, the Sentencing Commission 
promulgated section 5K1.1.l87 Congress, through the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, added subsection (e) to 18 U.S.C. § 3553.188 
The provisions mirror one another, both in substance and 
procedure. 
Substantively, these provisions authorize the district court 
to depart downward from applicable penalty ranges in 
recognition of a defendant's substantial assistance to the 
government.189 Section 5K1.1 allows for a downward departure 
from the otherwise applicable sentencing range under the 
Guidelines based on a defendant's cooperation.190 Similarly, 
section 3553(e) empowers the district court to impose a 
sentence below the mandatory mInImUm to reflect a 
187 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL § 5Kl.1. Section 5Kl.I provides: 
[d. 
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who 
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. (a) The 
appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that 
may include, but are not limited to, consideration of ... (1) the court's evaluation 
of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into 
consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the 
truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony 
provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's 
assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the 
defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; and (5) the timeliness of 
the defendant's assistance. 
188 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). Section 3553(e) provides: 
[d. 
LIMITED AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE A SENTENCE BELOW A STATUTORY MINIMUM. -
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a 
sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to 
reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of 
another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed 
in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code. 
189 Lee II, supra note 136, at 204. 
190 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5K1.1. 
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defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or 
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.191 
From a procedural perspective, both section 5K1.1 and 
section 3553(e) require, as a condition precedent to departure, a 
government motion.192 The federal court cannot depart below 
the applicable sentencing range because of a defendant's 
substantial assistance without a motion from the prosecutor 
requesting departure.193 If the prosecutor does not file a 
departure motion, the court may not question the prosecutor's 
decision unless the defendant makes a substantial threshold 
showing that the government's decision is based on an 
unconstitutional motive such as race or the exercise of a 
constitutional right, or not rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental objective. 194 
Moreover, the extent to which a court can independently 
sentence a defendant by departing from the Guidelines and 
statutory mlmmums is constrained by the departure 
recommended by the prosecutor in his substantial-assistance 
motion. 195 A prosecutor's request that the court depart from 
the sentencing range under the Guidelines does not allow for a 
similar departure from the applicable mandatory-minimum 
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
192 See id.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.l. 
193 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.l. See also 
Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120, 122 (1996) (holding that two substantial· 
assistance motions, one under section 5K1.1 and another under section 3553(e), are 
needed if defendant wants departures below both the applicable guideline range and 
mandatory-minimum sentence). 
194 See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). In Wade, the United 
States Supreme Court considered "whether district courts may subject the 
Government's refusal to file ... a [substantial-assistance] motion to review for 
constitutional violations." [d. at 183. As a preliminary matter, the Court noted that 
both section 5K1.1 and section 3553(e) limit judicial authority and grant the prosecutor 
the power, but not the duty, to file a motion requesting a downward departure in 
exchange for a defendant's substantial assistance. See id. at 185. The Court then held, 
however, that the prosecutor's discretion to file a substantial-assistance motion is 
subject to constitutional limitations enforceable by the district courts. See id. 
Specifically, a defendant would be entitled to judicial review of the prosecutor's 
decision if he could show that the prosecutor acted pursuant to an unconstitutional 
motive, such as race or religion. See id. at 185-86. A defendant would also be entitled 
to judicial review if he could show that the prosecutor's decision was not rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest. See Wade, 504 U.S. at 186. Since the 
defendant in Wade failed to allege an unconstitutional motive, but rather merely 
insisted that his assistance to the prosecution was substantial and warranted a 
departure, his sentence was affirmed. See id. at 186-87. 
196 See Melendez, 518 U.S. at 126. 
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statute unless the prosecutor makes such a request.19S Hence, 
the substantial-assistance structure has further constrained 
the judiciary while enhancing the power of the prosecutor.197 
In Melendez v. United States,198 the United States Supreme 
Court held that a district court may not depart below a 
statutory mInImUm sentence where the prosecutor's 
substantial-assistance motion requested only a departure 
below the applicable sentencing range under the Sentencing 
Guidelines.199 To the Court, the language found in both section 
5K1.1 and section 3553(e) was unambiguous. Section 5K1.1 
authorizes departures below the Guidelines range while a 
substantial-assistance motion under section 3553(e) authorizes 
departures below the mandatory-minimum sentence.2OO Where 
the prosecutor, therefore, had moved solely under section 
5K1.1, the district court could depart below the applicable 
196 See id. 
197 See id. ("[N]othing in (section] 3553(e) suggests that a district court has power to 
impose a sentence below the statutory minimum to reflect a defendant's cooperation 
when the Government has not authorized such a sentence, but has instead moved for a 
departure only from the applicable Guidelines range."); Wade, 504 U.S. at 185 ("(I]n 
both (sections] 3553(e) and (] 5K1.1 the condition limiting the court's authority (to 
move for substantial assistance] gives the Government a power, not a duty, to file a 
motion when a defendant has substantially assisted."). 
198 Melendez v. United States, 518 U.S. 120 (1996). 
199 See id. at 124. The Melendez Court addressed a question. that had been left 
unresolved in Wade - whether a prosecutor must file two substantial-assistance 
motions, one under section 5K1.1 and a second under section 3553(e), to depart below 
both the sentencing range under the Guidelines and the statutory mandatory· 
minimum sentence that falls below the applicable Guidelines range. See Wade, 504 
U.S. at 185 (''We are not ... called upon to decide whether ... the two provisions pose 
two separate obstacles."). In Melendez, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to 
distribute and to possess more than five kilograms of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846, an 
offense carrying a mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years. See Melendez, 518 U.S. 
at 122. The defendant agreed to cooperate with the prosecution in exchange for a 
motion under section 5K1.1 requesting a departure from the applicable sentencing 
range under the Guidelines. See id. The parties' agreement did not require that the 
prosecution move for a departure below the statutory minimum sentence. See id. 
Under the Guidelines, the defendant was exposed to imprisonment between 135 and 
168 months. See id. As he had promised, the prosecutor filed a substantial-assistance 
motion under section 5K1.1, asking that the court impose a sentence below the 
Guideline range. See id. at 122-23. The district court granted the departure motion, 
but imposed a sentence of 120 months on the ground that it could not also depart below 
the ten-year mandatory sentence without a separate motion under section 3553(e). See 
Melendez, 518 U.S. at 123. The defendant's primary contention on appeal was "that 
[section] 5K1.1 create[d] a 'unitary' motion system, in which a motion attesting to the 
substantial assistance of the defendant and requesting a departure below the 
Guidelines range also permits a district court to depart below the statutory minimum." 
[d. at 125. 
200 See id. at 130-31. 
29
Hrvatin: Substantial Assistance
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
146 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:2 
Guidelines range, but only to the extent that such a departure 
did not venture below the mandatory-minimum sentence.201 To 
accomplish a further departure below the mandatory-minimum 
sentence, a second substantial-assistance motion, this one 
under section 3553(e), was required.202 
The significance of Melendez is undisputed. The decision 
makes clear that the prosecutor not only controls whether a 
departure can be granted, but also, through its power to 
withhold a second substantial-assistance motion, the extent of 
the departure.203 Hence, the Supreme Court's interpretation of 
the substantial-assistance provisions within the greater 
framework of federal sentencing acknowledges the 
enhancement of sentencing discretion in the executive at the 
expense of the judicial branch.204 
Admittedly, prosecutors have always had the discretion to 
decide what, when, and where to charge.205 Prosecutors also 
have the discretion to decide what cases to bring, when to grant 
immunity, when to plea bargain, and what sentencing 
recommendations to make.206 The current sentencing system, 
however, bestows upon the prosecutor an additional power that 
directly affects the sentencing of the defendant.207 As 
mentioned, only the prosecutor may file a substantial-
assistance motion so that the judge may depart from the 
sentencing range under the Guidelines or an applicable 
mandatory-minimum statute.208 Thus, the prosecutor acts as 
both the prosecutor and the sentencing judge.209 Although the 
sentencing reforms of the 1980s were designed to limit the 
sentencing discretion of federal judges, the discretion has 
simply shifted from the judiciary to the prosecutor.210 
201 See id. at 125-26. 
202 See id. at 125-26, 131. 
203 Lee II, supra note 136, at 234. 
204 Id. ("Melendez . .. signals an expansion of the prosecutor's formerly limited role 
as gatekeeper to that of a concierge. Prosecutors now not only have the power to decide 
which defendants will be permitted to enter the substantial assistance gate, they also 
control which rooms ... cooperating defendants may enter."). 
205 Dion, supra note 86, at 175. 
206 Id. See also supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
207 See Dion, supra note 86, at 175 (citing Lee I, supra note 106, at 108). 
208 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
209 Dion, supra note 86, at 175. 
210 Id. (citing Fisher, supra note 101, at 749). 
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The Sentence Reform Act and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
dramatically affected the process of plea bargaining for 
testimony in federal court.211 With the adoption of harsher 
mandatory-minimum penalties, prosecutorial control over plea-
bargain negotiations has increased.212 Prosecutors can use the 
strict and mandatory sentences as ''bargaining chips" to induce 
defendants to plead guilty to lesser charges and thereby avoid 
severe prison sentences.213 Prosecutors have another 
bargaining chip in substantial assistance, over which they 
maintain nearly unfettered discretion.214 Substantial 
assistance is virtually the only way defendants can depart from 
stiff sentences.215 
All told, criminal defendants have a powerful incentive to 
shift the blame to other defendants.216 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the most common ground for departure217 from 
the otherwise applicable sentencing range is cooperation with 
the government in the prosecution of others, or "substantial . 
assistance."218 
IV. THE JUDICIAL REJECTION OF SEPARATION-OF-POWERS 
CHALLENGES TO THE GOVERNMENT-MOTION REQUIREMENT OF 
SUBSTANTIAL AsSISTANCE 
A. THE RESPONSE OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS 
A common constitutional challenge to the government-
motion requirement is that the requirement violates the 
separation-of-powers doctrine because the authority to decide 
whether a defendant should receive leniency for substantial 
assistance is taken away from the judiciary and delegated to 
the executive branch.219 This argument assumes that 
211 Bowman, supra note 98, at 13. 
212 See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the 
Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 73 (1993). 
213 Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 202. 
214 See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
215 Bowman, supra note 98, at 14-15. 
216 [d. at 15. 
217 For other departures under the Guidelines, see supra note 134 and accompanying 
text. 
218 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
219 Lee I, supra note 106, at 134. For cases that thoroughly discuss separation-of-
powers challenges to substantial assistance, see United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 
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sentencing is primarily a judicial function, which IS 
compromised if the prosecutor has the authority to control 
when a judge may reward a defendant for substantial 
assistance.22o 
The federal appellate courts, however, have rejected the 
separation-of-powers argument for a number of reasons. 
Sentencing, to start, has never been within the exclusive 
arsenal of the judiciary.221 Congress has always had the power 
to limit the discretion of judges by enacting statutes with 
mInImUm and maximum sentences.222 Similarly, the 
prosecutor, through his charging function, has always had 
some influence over a defendant's ultimate sentence.223 
Accordingly, appellate courts have concluded that giving the 
prosecutor some sentencing authority does not 
unconstitutionally intrude upon the sentencing authority of the 
judiciary.224 
Moreover, since Congress has the power to limit the factors 
that a court can consider in sentencing a defendant, federal 
appellate courts have acknowledged that Congress could have 
totally precluded judges from even considering a defendant's 
substantial assistance.225 As a defendant has no right to 
substantial assistance, he cannot challenge the manner in 
which it was enacted by Congress.226 
Finally, courts have rejected the argument that the 
government-motion requirement violates separation of powers 
because the discretion granted the prosecutor is limited to the 
authority to file a motion for downward departure, while the 
91-93 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); United States v. Francois, 889 
F.2d 1341, 1344 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1085 (1990); United States v 
Spillman, 924 F.2d 721, 724·25 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 
653 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); United States v. Severich, 676 
F.Supp. 1209, 1212·13 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 872 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1988). 
220 Lee I, supra note 106, at 134. 
221 [d. 
222 [d.; Hatch, supra note 172, at 186·87 (listing the ways in which Congress has 
maintained some influence over sentencing including the enactment of mandatory· 
minimum sentences); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (noting that 
Congress has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime, and the scope of judicial 
discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control). 
223 Lee I, supra note 106, at 134·35. 
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court is still left with the ultimate decision as to whether to 
depart, and if so, to what extent.227 
B. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT HAs RESPONDED 
DIFFERENTLY TO SEPARATION-OF-POWERS CHALLENGES TO 
STATUTES ANALOGOUS TO SECTION 3553(E) AND SECTION 5K1.1 
The California Supreme Court initially applied similar 
reasoning to uphold former California Health and Safety Code 
section 11718,228 which prohibited a judge from striking a prior 
conviction from a complaint or information without the 
prosecutor's prior approva1.229 In People v. Sidener,23o the court 
rejected a separation-of-powers challenge to section 11718, 
finding that the decision to strike a prior conviction was simply 
part of the prosecutor's charging discretion.231 
Eight years later, however, in People v. Tenorio,232 the 
California Supreme Court overruled its holding in People v. 
Sidener and struck down section 11718 on separation-of-powers 
grounds.233 Section 11718, like section 3553(e) and section 
5Kl.1, vested the court with the ultimate power to dismiss, but 
conditioned the exercise of that power upon prior approval of 
the prosecutor.234 On this occasion, the court explained that a 
judge's sentencing role is compromised when he believes that a 
prosecutor's approval is necessary before a charge can be 
dismissed in the interests of justice.235 
The court also rejected the argument that because the 
California Legislature has the authority to completely remove 
the power to strike prior convictions from the courts without 
227 [d. 
228 Former Health and Safety Code section 11718 provided that: 
[N]o allegation of fact which, if admitted or found to be true, would change the 
penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would be if such fact were 
not alleged and admitted or proved to be true may be dismissed by the court or 
stricken from the accusatory pleading except upon motion of the district 
attorney. 
Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11718 (West 1961) (repealed 1972). 
229 Lee I, supra note 106, at 136. 
230 People v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645 (1962), reu'd sub. nom. People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 
3d 89 (1970). 
231 Lee I, supra note 106, at 136. 
232 People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89 (1970). 
233 See id. at 95. 
234 See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
235 See Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94. 
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constitutional consequence, the Legislature could permissibly 
divide discretion between the prosecutor and the judge.236 
Once authority was given to the courts to dismiss prior 
convictions, the Legislature could not condition the exercise of 
that authority upon a prosecutor's motion without violating the 
Constitution.237 
In People v. Superior Court (Romero),238 the California 
Supreme Court followed the logic of People v. Tenorio to declare 
that an interpretation of the State's "Three Strikes" law that 
would deprive a trial judge of the power to dismiss a prior-
felony-conviction allegation absent the prosecutor's consent 
violated separation of powers.239 
Under California Penal Code section 667(f)(2), a prosecutor 
has the discretion to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction 
either in the interests of justice or where there is insufficient 
evidence to prove the prior conviction.240 It was argued that 
236 Lee I, supra note 106, at 137. The Tenorio court said: 
[E)ven if the Legislature could constitutionally remove the power to strike priors 
from the courts, it has not done so, but rather has purported to vest in the 
prosecutor the power to foreclose the exercise of an admittedly judicial power by 
an appropriate judicial officer. It is no answer to suggest that this is but a lesser 
included portion of the prosecutor's discretion to forego prosecution, as the 
decision to forego prosecution does not itself deprive persons of liberty. 
Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 94. 
237 Lee I, supra note 106, at 137. 
238 People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996). 
239 See id. at 513. The defendant in Romero was charged with drug possession in 
violation of California Health and Safety Code section 11350(a). See id. at 506. He 
also had suffered four prior convictions for second-degree burglary, attempted burglary, 
first-degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling, and drug possession. See id. As a result 
of his convictions for second-degree burglary and first-degree burglary of an inhabited 
dwelling, the defendant was a candidate for life imprisonment under California's 
"Three Strikes" sentencing law. See id. The defendant pleaded not guilty to the 
underlying charge of drug possession. See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507. The trial court, 
under the authority of Penal Code section 1385(a), offered to strike allegations of the 
defendant's prior felony convictions if he changed his plea to guilty. See id. The 
prosecutor objected, arguing that under Penal Code section 667(t)(2), the court had no 
power to dismiss the prior felony allegations in a Three Strikes case unless the 
prosecutor asked the court to do so. See id. The trial court disagreed, rmding that such 
an interpretation of the Three Strikes law would violate the constitutional doctrine of 
separation of powers. See id. 
240 Section 667(t)(2) provides: 
The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction 
allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to [penal Code) Section 1385, or 
if there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior conviction. If upon the 
satisfaction of the court that there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior 
felony conviction, the court may dismiss or strike the allegation. 
Cal. Penal Code § 667(t)(2) (West 1999). 
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under the statute the court.could not on its own motion and in 
furtherance of justice strike a prior conviction that exposed a 
defendant to an enhanced sentence without the prosecutor's 
prior approva1.241 Trial courts, however, regularly exercised 
such authority pursuant to Penal Code section 1385(a).242 The 
issue was whether the Legislature intended the Three Strikes 
law to give prosecutors the power to veto judicial decisions to 
dismiss prior-felony-conviction allegations in furtherance of 
justice under section 1385(a).243 
Recognizing that the Legislature could have completely 
eliminated a trial court's power to strike prior felony 
allegations without constitutional consequence, the Supreme 
Court rejected the contention that the Legislature, having 
given courts the power to dismiss, could then condition that 
power on the prior approval of the prosecutor.244 Rather, since 
dismissal was a judicial rather than an executive function, a 
law that subjected the court's discretion to dispose of criminal 
charges to prosecutorial approval violated separation of 
powers.245 Accordingly, the Three Strikes law did not obviate a 
court's ability to strike prior-felony-conviction allegations on its 
own motion in the furtherance of justice. 246 
The California approach, as taken in both People v. Tenorio 
and Romero, stands in clear contrast with the federal appellate 
courts' rejection of separation-of-powers challenges to similar 
government-motion requirements.247 
241 See Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513. 
242 See id. at 508. Penal Code section 1385(a) provides: 
The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon application of the 
prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed .... 
This section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of a serious felony 
for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section 667. 
Cal. Penal Code § 1385(a) (West 1999). 
243 Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507,517-18. 
244 See id. at 516, 518, 528. 
245 See id. at 515-16. 
246 See id. at 518, 529-30. 
247 Lee I, supra note 106, at 137. 
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V. THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS DOCTRINE IS VIOLATED WHEN 
DRUG KINGPINS RECEIVE DOWNWARD DEPARTURES BECAUSE 
CONGRESS NEVER INTENDED KINGPINS TO RECEIVE' SENTENCE 
LENIENCY AT THE EXPENSE OF LOWER-LEVEL CONSPIRATORS 
What kind of a criminal justice system rewards the drug 
kingpin ... who informs on all the criminal colleagues he or 
she has recruited, but sends to prison for years and years the 
least knowledgeable or culpable conspirator, one who knows 
very little about the conspiracy and is without information for 
the prosecutors? 248 
Allowing a downward departure for defendants who 
cooperate rewards culpable offenders who "snitch" on others.249 
In certain instances, this is unwise and irrational. Often, the 
cooperating defendant has engaged III serIOUS criminal 
248 United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J., dissenting). 
Judge Myron H. Bright of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is an outspoken and 
consistent critic of the federal sentencing system as it applies to drug offenses. See, 
e.g., United States v. Jones, 145 F.3d 959, 966 (8th Cir. 1998) (Bright, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) ("In this case, the lowest person on the totem pole, a mere 
street-level seller with an I.Q. of fifty-three received a heavier sentence than the 
mastermind of the conspiracy and the conspiracy's primary drug supplier. What kind 
of system could produce such a result?"); United States v. Romero, 118 F.3d 576, 582 
(8th Cir. 1997) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("This case provides a typical, yet disturbing 
glimpse into the underbelly of prosecuting non-violent, first time drug offenders under 
mandatory minimum sentences."); United States v. Kalb, 105 F.3d 426, 430 (8th Cir. 
1997) (Bright, J., dissenting) ("These sentencing schemes essentially take the 
discretionary power to determine the length of a defendant's sentence away from 
Article III judges and place it in the hands of prosecutors who control the charges 
brought against a defendant."); United States v. Knapp, 955 F.2d 566, 570-71 (8th Cir. 
1997) (Bright, J., concurring separately) (arguing that a latecomer or minor participant 
to the drug-trafficking conspiracy should not automatically be held responsible for the 
same amount of drugs as other conspirators); Montanye v. United States, 77 F.3d 226, 
233 (8th Cir. 1996) (Bright, J., dissenting) (rmding a thirty-year sentence "draconian, 
unnecessarily harsh and unreasonable," where defendant furnished glassware to the 
conspiracy, a conspiracy which incidentally never delivered one gram of drugs to any 
consumer); United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1365-66 (8th Cir. 1995) (Bright, J., 
concurring) ("I have seen draconian sentences meted out in drug cases where an 
offender has had no contact with any drugs but may be only a minor functionary in a 
drug conspiracy where heavy amounts of drugs could be involved."); United States v. 
Goebel, 898 F.2d 675, 678 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring) (observing that the 
Sentencing Guidelines produce unjust sentences among similar offenders); United 
States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1221 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) ('This case opens the window on the sometimes bizarre and 
topsy-turvy world of sentencing under the Guidelines."). 
249 Lee II, supra note 136, at 209. 
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behavior.250 The cooperating defendant, however, ends up with 
a lighter sentence than less culpable offenders because he is 
able to cooperate with the prosecutor.251 Still, under such 
circumstances, judges have been virtually powerless to 
interfere. 252 
A "cooperation paradox" results when the ''big fish" ends 
up with a lighter sentence than the "little fish."253 The 
"cooperation paradox" reveals itself most prominently in drug-
conspiracy cases where co-conspirators operating at the lower 
levels of the conspiracy have little or no information to provide 
the prosecution while those participants at the higher levels 
are more knowledgeable and thus in the best position to take 
advantage of substantial assistance.254 
The "cooperation paradox," together with the judges' 
inability to depart from the determined sentencing range 
without a prosecutorial substantial-assistance motion, results 
in "inverted sentencing."255 Inverted sentencing allows 
knowledgeable, and, therefore, highly culpable offenders to 
250 [d. 
261 [d. 
252 See, e.g., United States v. Brigham, 977 F.2d 317,318 (7th Cir. 1992) (where the 
least culpable offender in a drug conspiracy received the longest term of imprisonment, 
the court noted that such a sentencing inversion "is neither illegal nor 
unconstitutional, because offenders have no right to be sentenced in proportion to their 
wrongs ... [even though] meting out the harshest penalties to those least culpable is 
troubling, because it accords with no one's theory of appropriate punishments") 
(citation omitted). For a discussion of Brigham, which "clearly illustrates both the 
judges' impotence under the mandatory minimum statutory regime, [and] also the 
inequitable results associated with . . . substantial assistance," see Oliss, supra note 
149, at 1857-58. 
253 Lee II, supra note 136, at 210 (citing Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 211-13). More 
specifically, Professor Schulhofer says that: 
[T]he escape hatch for cooperation creates a paradox. Defendants who are most 
in the know, and thus have the most "substantial assistance" to offer, are often 
those who are most centrally involved in conspiratorial crimes. The highly 
culpable offender may be the best placed to negotiate a big sentencing break. 
Minor players, peripherally involved and with little knowledge or responsibility, 
have little to offer and thus can wind up with far more severe sentences than the 
boss. 
Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 212. 
254 Lee II, supra note 136, at 210 & n.52. See also Tease, supra note 135, at 75 
("[T]he minor offender does not possess the information the government seeks ... By 
virtue of his lesser culpability, . . . [he] is deprived of the opportunity to obtain a 
downward departure . . . [for substantial] assistance . . . Thus, a major offender may 
receive a more lenient sentence than a codefendant whose role ... was minor."). 
265 See Oliss, supra note 149, at 1858, 1863-64 (referring to the "cooperation 
paradox" as "inverted sentencing"). 
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escape the mandatory sentences, while less culpable actors, 
who were not the target of stiff mandatory sentences, receive 
the harsh penalties.256 This undermines the goals of just 
punishment as well as the incarceration of dangerous felons 
and contributes to a new form of disparity in sentencing. 257 
Congress was not unaware of this unjust result. The 
Sentencing Commission, directed by Congress to explore the 
tension between the Guidelines' system of graduated, 
proportional sentencing and mandatory minimums' "charge 
offense" approach, concluded that by limiting the effect of 
mitigating factors, mandatory minimums led to instances in 
which defendants convicted of offenses that differed in 
seriousness nonetheless received similarly severe sentences.258 
Then, in July 1993, based upon information presented at a 
hearing before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal 
Justice, members of Congress determined that strict 
mandatory-minimum sentences coupled with downward 
departures for substantial assistance created sentencing 
disparity that substantially affected low-level drug offenders.259 
Indeed, judges were forced to impose severe mandatory 
sentences on low-level drug defendants who were not the focus 
256 Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 213 ("Instead of a pyramid of liability with long 
sentences for leaders at the top of the organizational ladder, the mandatory system can 
become an inverted pyramid with stiff sentences for minor players and modest 
punishments for knowledgeable insiders who can cut favorable deals."). But see 
Bowman, supra note 98, at 48·53 (arguing that challenges based on the "cooperation 
paradox" have been made without specific evidence that high·level drug offenders 
benefit more from departures for substantial assistance than low·level co·conspirators 
and alleging that the statistical evidence that does exist lends support to the 
impression that the "cooperation paradox" is not much of a problem in the real world). 
257 Oliss, supra note 149, at 1864 (citing Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 211·13). See 
also supra note 4 and accompanying text. But see Bowman, supra note 98, at 50 ("The 
particular outrage expressed by critics over situations in which the sentence of a 'more 
culpable' cooperator is lower than that of a 'less culpable' non·cooperator is a red 
herring."). An apparent lack of statistical support, upon which Professor Bowman 
relies to discredit a "cooperation paradox" in federal sentencing, see supra note 256 and 
accompanying text, should not interfere with the courts' ability to remedy the obvious 
disparity that results in cases like that of Mr. Aaron, see supra Part I, or Mr. Brigham, 
see supra note 252 and accompanying text. Where a low·level conspirator suffers the 
brunt of the punishment while acknowledged kingpins receive sentence leniency for 
substantial assistance, judicial intervention is appropriate to correct the prosecutorial 
usurpation of delegated authority. Specific statistical data is perhaps necessary to 
urge a congressional response to the "cooperation paradox." In the meantime, however, 
some defendants need a measure of protection, which can be accomplished through the 
application of the exclusionary rule. See discussion infra Part VI. 
258 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1495 (citing SPECIAL REPORT, at 20-33). 
259 [d. at 1495·96 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 460, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1994». 
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of Congress' intent when it enacted mandatory minimums.26o 
Congress instead had designed mandatory-minimum sentences 
to apply to the more culpable drug-conspiracy kingpins and 
mid-level dealers.261 
Congress realized that it could strengthen the integrity 
and effectiveness of mandatory-minimum sentencing by 
creating a limited exception from these penalties for the least 
culpable, low-level drug offenders.262 Accordingly, in response 
to concerns about the harsh effects of mandatory minimums on 
low-level offenders, Congress passed section 80001 of the 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.263 
The "safety valve" provision provides a narrow exemption 
from specific mandatory-minimum statutes to a certain first-
time, non-violent, low-level drug offenders.264 The safety valve 
is an exception to, and not a departure from, otherwise 
applicable mandatory-minimum sentences.265 That is, if a 
defendant falls within the safety-valve exception, the 
mandatory-minimum statute simply does not apply.266 The 
district court then proceeds as if sentencing a defendant who is 
not subject to a mandatory-minimum sentence by applying the 
Sentencing Guidelines to arrive at the appropriate sentence.267 
Under the Guidelines, a limited two-level downward departure 
is available if the defendant's base-offense level is twenty-six or 
higher.26B 
Unlike departures for substantial assistance, eligibility for 
the safety valve is not contingent upon the usefulness of the 
260 Id. at 1496. 
261 Id.; SPECIAL REPORT, at 10. 
262 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1496 & n.218. 
263 Pub. L. No. 103·322, § 80001, 108 Stat. 1796, 1985 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(1) (2000». The Sentencing Commission added a similar provision to the 
Sentencing Guidelines, recognizing an exemption from the otherwise applicable 
mandatory penalty statutes. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5C1.2 
(2001). The provision under both section 3553(1) and section 5C1.2 are substantively 
identical, and will collectively be referred to as the "safety valve." 
264 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1496. 
265 Id. at 1497. 
266 See id. at 1497·98. 
267 See id. at 1498. See Jon M. Sands, How Does the Safety Value Work? Sentencing 
Issues Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0 and U.S.S.G. § 5Cl.2, 20 DEC·CHAMPION 37, 41 (1996) 
(''The safety valve is not a departure. It merely removes the mandatory nature of 
certain sentences. It essentially clears the pipe of the mandatory minimum blockage. 
The defendant must still deal with the guidelines."). 
266 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(b)(6). 
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defendant's information.269 Neither does the safety valve 
require a motion by the prosecutor.270 The judge, therefore, 
rather than the prosecutor, determines whether a defendant 
qualifies for relief under the safety valve.271 The absence of a 
government-motion requirement is significant. It symbolizes a 
renewed faith in the district courts' ability to exercise 
sentencing discretion without prosecutorial oversight.272 
Defendants who seek the benefit of the safety-valve 
exception bear the initial burden of demonstrating, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that they are eligible.273 A 
defendant cannot have more than one criminal-history point.274 
Second, the offense at issue must have been non-violent and 
committed without the use of a dangerous weapon.275 If the 
offense resulted in the death or serious injury to any person, 
the defendant is not eligible.276 A defendant is similarly 
ineligible if he was the leader in the offense or engaged in a 
continuing criminal enterprise.277 Finally, the defendant must 
provide the prosecution with all information that he has 
relating to the offense.278 The court, if it is satisfied that the 
269 Lee II, supra note 136, at 215. 
270 [d. 
271 [d. 
272 [d. at 215·16. 
273 [d. at 214. 
274 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(1); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(1) 
(providing, as the first criteria, that the safety valve shall apply if the "the defendant 
does not have more than 1 criminal history point ... n). 
275 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(2); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(2) 
(stating that a defendant is eligible for the safety valve if he "did not use violence or 
credible threats of violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon ... in 
connection with the offense ... "). 
276 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(3); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(3) 
(noting that the safety valve is available so long as "the offense did not result in death 
or serious bodily injury to any person ... "). 
277 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(4); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(4) 
(permitting the application of the safety valve if "the defendant was not an organizer, 
leader, manager, or supervisor of others ... and was not engaged in a continuing 
criminal enterprise ... "). 
278 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(5); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(5) 
(providing for the safety valve if "not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 
defendant has truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the 
defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of 
conduct or of a common scheme or plan . . ."). Distinguishable from substantial· 
assistance departures, "the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other 
information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the information 
shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with 
this requirement." See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(0(5); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEUNES MANuAL § 
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defendant has met his burden, can then impose a sentence in 
accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines without regard to 
any statutory minimum sentence.279 
At the very least, the safety valve has the potential of 
reducing the grossly _ disproportionate sentences for less 
culpable offenders and militates against the "cooperation 
paradox" by providing a remedy for those offenders who cannot 
secure a substantial-assistance motion but still are willing to 
disclose what information they have.28o Before the safety valve, 
defendants convicted of certain drug crimes could receive a 
sentence below the statutory minimum only on the prosecutor's 
motion to depart downward based on a defendant's substantial 
assistance.281 The safety valve was enacted to rectify the 
inequity in this system, whereby a more culpable defendant 
who could provide the prosecutor with useful information about 
drug-related activities faired better under section 3553(e) or 
section 5K1.1 than lower-level offenders who typically had less 
knowledge.282 Accordingly, the safety valve was an attempt by 
Congress to ensure that its mandatory-minimum penalties 
were applied to higher-level drug conspirators.283 
The safety valve, however, falls short of Congress' goal of 
relieving the disparity in sentencing because it is too restrictive 
with respect to the class of defendants to which it applies.284 
The safety valve's five requirements are so narrow in scope 
that not all low-level offenders are eligible for the provision.285 
5C1.2(a)(5). 
279 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 5C1.2 (stating 
that the court shall impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable guidelines 
without regard to any statutory minimum sentence). 
280 Oliss, supra note 149, at 1886. 
281 Sands, supra note 267, at 37. 
282 See id. 
283 Lee II, supra note 136, at 215. See also Froyd, supra note 24, at 1498; Oliss, 
supra note 149, at 1888. 
284 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1498 (citing Virginia G. Villa, Retooling Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing: Fixing the Federal "Statutory Safety Valve" to Act as an Effective 
Mechanism for Clemency in Appropriate Cases, 21 RAMLINE L. REV. 109, 125 (1997». 
See also Sands, supra note 267, at 42 ("The safety valve is not a cure-all. It does not 
completely loosen the heavy-handed approach of mandatory minimums for many, if not 
most, drug defendants. Neither does it soften the choke hold of the federal sentencing 
guidelines."). 
285 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1498 & n.234 (citing cases in which relief under the 
safety valve was denied because the defendant had more than one criminal-history 
point, possessed a firearm, or failed to give the government all the information he had 
pertaining to the offense). For purposes of illustration, suppose that as a result of a 
41
Hrvatin: Substantial Assistance
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
158 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:2 
Consequently, the safety valve fails to 
severe mandatory sentences apply 
offenders.286 
ensure that the more 
only to high-level 
VI. To REMEDY THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS VIOLATION WHEN 
KINGPIN DRUG DEALERS ARE REWARDED WITH SUBSTANTIAL 
AsSISTANCE, THEIR TESTIMONY AGAINST LESS CULPABLE, Low-
LEVEL CO-DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED PURSUANT TO 
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our 
government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good 
or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is 
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law 
unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the 
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the 
means-to declare that the government may commit crimes 
in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal-would 
bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine, 
this court should resolutely set its face. 287 
Under the authority of substantial assistance, the 
prosecutor, who is charged with enforcing the federal 
sentencing laws, is empowered to determine the punishment 
for violation of the laws. Congress never intended kingpin drug 
dealers to get the benefit of substantial-assistance motions at 
the expense of lower-level participants.288 When the prosecutor 
exercises his delegated authority to recommend a downward 
drug sale gone awry, the seller is shot dead by the buyer. An associate of the seller was 
present at the scene and was in his car awaiting the completion of the drug transaction 
but was not a participant to the shooting. If the associate is later indicted for his 
participation in the larger drug·trafficking conspiracy, he - assuming that he meets the 
other criteria - may not be eligible for the safety valve because on of the offenses 
resulted in someone's death. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(3); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANuAL § 5C1.2(a)(3). 
286 Froyd, supra note 24, at 1498. 
287 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled in part by Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 343 (1967). 
288 See Oliss, supra note 149, at 1888 (stating that the safety valve "is, ostensibly, a 
congressional acknowledgement of the failings of mandatory minimum sentencing and 
an attempt to prevent future inequitable consequences"). 
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departure for an acknowledged drug kingpin, the prosecutor 
has exceeded his authority and violated separation-of-power 
principles because he is acting contrary to legislative intent. 
Under such circumstances, the executive is making law and 
thereby encroaching upon the law-making function of 
Congress.289 The substantial-assistance motion is the vehicle 
through which the prosecutor legislates. 
This form of separation-of-powers violation, in which the 
prosecutor uses substantial assistance to usurp Congress' role 
as legislator, is not foreclosed by the federal appellate courts' 
rejection of separation-of-powers challenges to the government-
motion component of substantial assistance.29o To be sure, the 
focus here is not on whether the executive is improperly 
exercising sentencing authority at the expense of the judiciary. 
Rather, at issue is the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative branches. Having delegated to the prosecutor 
the discretion to enforce the sentencing laws and administer 
substantial assistance does not permit an exercise of that 
discretion in violation of congressional intent. 
Such abuse defeats the purpose of the sentence reforms of 
the 1980s.291 The application of substantial assistance in drug-
courier cases results in serious sentence disparity by producing 
unduly severe sentences for drug couriers and minor 
participants who know little about the drug-trafficking 
operation for which they work and unduly lenient sentences for 
high-level drug dealers who can tell all to save themselves from 
harsh sentences. 
To cure the constitutional violation, the testimony of 
cooperating kingpins that benefit from substantial-assistance 
motions should be suppressed pursuant .to the exclusionary 
rule.292 The United States Supreme Court has approved the 
289 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
290 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
291 See Freed, supra note 105, at 1712 (discussing the finding of the Sentencing 
Institute of the Second and Eighth Circuits that "vesting power over such departures in 
the unregulated discretion of an [Assistant United States Attorney], a nonneutral 
party, invited the very disparity that the [Sentencing Reform Act] had sought to 
eliminate."). 
292 "The exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but rather a 
judicially-created remedy to deter government violations of the Constitution." John F. 
Deters, The Exclusionary Rule, 89 GEO. L.J. 1216, 1216 (2001) (citing United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984». Dismissing the indictment altogether would be too 
drastic a remedy in most cases. See United States v. Bleu, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) 
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use of judicially-created exclusionary rules to remedy 
constitutional violations.293 
The exclusionary rule is regularly used to suppress 
evidence obtained directly or indirectly through government 
violations of the Fourth,294 Fifth,295 or Sixth Amendments.296 
The reach of the exclusionary rule, however, is broad enough to 
protect against other constitutional violations as well.297 As an 
exclusionary rule for evidence in criminal proceedings, the 
doctrine focuses on the link between the evidence procured and 
the initial illegality of a government tactic.298 When evidence is 
admitted at trial in violation of the exclusionary rule, reversal 
is required unless the error was harmless.299 
Originally, the exclusionary rule was created with the 
purpose of deterring police misconduct.30o With that continued 
focus, the United States Supreme Court has since declined to 
extend the rule to errors made by judicial officers, such as 
(U[P]recedentD ordering the exclusion of . . . illegally obtained evidence assume[s] 
implicitly that the remedy does not extend to barring the prosecution altogether. So 
drastic a step might advance marginally some of the ends served by exclusionary rules, 
but it would also ... interfereD with ... having the guilty brought to book."). 
293 See Finklea, supra note 83, at 982·83. 
294 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that U[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause ... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (exclusionary rule applies in federal court to evidence obtained in 
violation of the 4th Amendment). 
295 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that U[n]o 
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw ... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 548 (1897) 
(exclusionary rule applies in federal court to evidence obtained in violation of the 5th 
Amendment). 
296 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that U[iJn all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by 
an impartial jury ... and ... be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . . and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 
218, 239·42 (1967) (witness identification excluded because post·indictment lineup 
violated 6th Amendment right to counsel); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 
206·07 (1964) (statements excluded because deliberately elicited in violation of 
defendant's 6th Amendment right to counsel). 
297 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
298 See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978). 
299 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23·24 (1967). Harmless error is error 
that does not affect a party's substantive rights or the case's outcome. See BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 563 (7th ed. 1999). 
300 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). 
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judges or magistrates, when issuing warrants.301 In so holding, 
the Court emphasized that judges and magistrates are not 
adjuncts to the law-enforcement team.302 Rather, as neutral 
judicial officers, they fulfill their duties with no stake in the 
outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.303 Thus, the 
threat of exclusion of evidence could not be expected to deter 
such individuals from issuing warrants in violation of the 
Constitution.304 
The Supreme Court used similar reasoning to fmd the 
exclusionary rule inapplicable to the errors of legislators.305 
The Court again distinguished the role of legislators from that 
of the police. Legislators enact laws to establish and 
perpetuate the criminal justice system, a deliberative process 
that is significantly different from the hurried judgment of law-
enforcement officers "engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime."306 In this way, although 
legislators are not neutral judicial officers, like judges and 
magistrates, neither can they be classified as members of the 
law-enforcement team.307 In light of the presumption that 
legislators perform their duties in accordance with the 
Constitution, the Court found no reason to believe that the 
exclusionary rule would deter lawlessness among legislators.30s 
The apparent narrowing of the exclusionary rule is not 
determinative here.309 The focus of this separation-of-powers 
argument is on the actions of the prosecutor. To start, in 
contrast to judicial officers or legislators, prosecutors are not 
neutral participants in the criminal justice system. Instead, 
301 See id. In Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule should not be applied 
to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant issued by a 
neutral magistrate was objectively reasonable, even though the warrant was 
ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause and was, therefore, defective. 
See id. at 918-22. This exception to the exclusionary rule is known as the good-faith 
exception. See id. at 920-21. 
302 Id. at 916-17. 
303 Leon, 468 U.S. at 917. 
304 Id. 
305 See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350-52 (1987). 
306 Id. at 351 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948». 
307 Id. at 350-51 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 917). 
308 Id. at 351 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 916). 
309 See id. at 347-48 (in determining the application of the exclusionary rule, "the 
Court has examined whether the rule's deterrent effect will be achieved, and has 
weighed the likelihood of such deterrence against the costs of withholding reliable 
information from the truth-seeking process'') (citations omitted). 
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they work hand-in-hand with the police "for the purpose of 
procuring evidence in particular criminal investigations."31o 
The extension, therefore, of the exclusionary rule to 
prosecutors is a narrow and appropriate one. 
More importantly, enforcing the exclusionary rule in this 
context would serve to deter and to compel respect for the 
Constitution by removing from the prosecutors the incentive to 
disregard it.3ll Deterring violations of constitutional rights is 
the core rationale for excluding illegally-obtained evidence.312 
Indeed, the rule is designed to prevent, rather than repair.313 
Here, the violation of separation of powers urges 
suppression. When prosecutors use substantial-assistance 
motions to reward drug kingpins with sentence leniency, 
separation-of-powers principles are violated because 
prosecutors abuse the discretion granted to them by Congress 
to enforce the federal sentencing laws. Under such 
circumstances, the intent of federal sentencing is defeated. 
Exclusion is the most effective way to certify compliance with 
congressional intent, for the rule furthers the valuable public 
policy of deterring abuses of power by the executive. 
The deterrent effect of the rule would serve to lessen, if not 
remove, the incentive prosecutors may have to abuse their 
sentencing discretion. When the potential consequence of such 
prosecutorial tactics is the suppression of testimony central to 
the prosecution's case, prosecutors might be more inclined to 
use caution in distributing substantial assistance. At bottom, 
310 Krull, 480 U.S. at 352. 
m United States v. Elkins, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). But see Dallin H. Oaks, 
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 755 
(1970) (explaining that there is "hardly any evidence" that the exclusionary rule exerts 
any deterrent effects on police behavior); Michael T. Kafka, Student Article, The 
Exclusionary Rule: An Alternative Perspective, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1895, 1920-21 
(2001) (arguing that there is a lack of data to support the proposition that the 
exclusionary rule works as a deterrent). 
312 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (''The criminal goes free, if he must, 
but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly 
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard for the charter of its own 
existence."). But see Kafka, supra note 311, at 1921 ("Given that there is a dearth of 
empirical evidence to support the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. 
combined with the fact that 'this effect is not so inherently likely that we can assume it 
to exist in the absence of proof: it is difficult to support its continued wholesale use.") 
(quoting Charles Alan Wright. Must a Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders? 50 
TEX. L. REV. 736. 741 (1972». 
313 Elkins. 364 U.S. at 217. 
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the exclusionary rule would challenge the credibility of 
kingpins who testify to the details of the conspiracy, including 
its scope and purpose, and the culpability of various 
participants like their low-level counterparts. 
At its inception, an additional purpose of the exclusionary 
rule was to preserve the imperative of judicial integrity.314 As 
early as 1888, the Supreme Court noted that courts have the 
inherent power over their own process to prevent abuse, 
oppression, and injustice.315 The exclusionary rule in this 
regard helped courts further the integrity of the judicial 
process, which otherwise was threatened if the courts 
condoned, implicitly if not explicitly, unconstitutional 
government tactics.316 Certainly, the objective of the judiciary 
should be to prevent crime rather than promote it.317 This 
rationale, however, has been abandoned by recent Supreme 
Court authority, leaving deterrence as the exclusionary rule's 
primary foCUS. 318 Still, recognizing that the judiciary must at 
the very least portray an image of impartiality, the 
exclusionary rule, if not applied to expressly further judicial 
integrity, can assure defendants and the public that courts will 
not allow the prosecutor to unfairly profit from his own 
unconstitutional behavior. 319 
314 See id. at 223. 
315 Finklea, supra note 83, at 983 (citing Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 144 (1888». 
316 See United States v. Bleu, 384 U.S. 251, 255 (1966) ("While the general common· 
law practice is to admit evidence despite its illegal origins, this Court in a number of 
areas has recognized or developed exclusionary rules where evidence has been gained 
in violation of the accused's rights under the Constitution, federal statutes, or federal 
rules of procedure."); Elkins, 364 U.S. at 223 ('"[AJ conviction resting on evidence 
secured through such a flagrant disregard of the procedure which Congress has 
commanded cannot be allowed to stand without making the courts themselves 
accomplices in willful disobedience of law .... ) (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 345 (1943». 
317 See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 449 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting) 
("It is the Government's duty to prevent crime, not to promote it."). The Supreme 
Court has enumerated three purposes for using the Court's inherent supervisory 
powers: (1) to implement a remedy for violation of recognized rights; (2) to preserve 
judicial integrity; and (3) as a remedy designed to deter illegal conduct. See Finklea, 
supra note 83, at 986 (citing United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983». 
318 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984). 
319 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (reasoning that the 
Constitution's Framers fashioned the exclusionary rule to assure "all potential victims 
of unlawful government conduct - that the government would not profit from its 
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Exclusion gives a defendant no more than that which the 
Constitution guarantees him, to the prosecutor no less than 
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and to the 
courts, that judicial integrity paramount in the true 
administration of justice.320 In other words, the prosecution 
should not be put in a better position than it would have been 
in if no illegality hl!ld occurred.321 But neither should the 
prosecution be put in a worse position simply because of some 
earlier error or misconduct by law enforcement.322 
As with any remedial device, the exclusionary rule's 
application has been restricted to those instances where its 
remedial objectives are most effectively served.323 Where the 
exclusionary rule does not promote deterrence, then its use is 
unwarranted.324 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has identified 
several exceptions to the exclusionary rule. A defendant, for 
example, must have standing to challenge the admission of 
evidence against him.325 
A court may also admit evidence that would not have been 
discovered but for official misconduct if the casual connection 
between the illegal conduct and the acquisition of the evidence 
is sufficiently attenuated.326 Similarly, even if agents of the 
executive engage in illegal investigatory activity, evidence will 
be admissible if it is discovered through a source independent 
of the illegality.327 Closely related to the independent-source 
exception, under the inevitable-discovery exception, a court 
320 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
321 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984). See also Jerry E. Norton, The 
Exclusionary Rule Reconsidered: Restoring the Status Quo Ante, 33 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 261, 262 (1998) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is a just one because it 
restores the status quo ante by putting both the State and the accused in the positions 
they would have been in had the Constitution not been violated - neither better nor 
worse). 
322 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443; Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 793 (1994) (indicating that those criminals who commit the 
abhorrent crimes that are often subject to application of the exclusionary rule should 
not gain a windfall over the people who both expect and deserve a prosecution from the 
production of evidence that is wholly reliable). 
323 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. 
324 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976). 
326 See Deters, supra note 292, at 1216-18. 
326 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (where defendant 
arrested without probable cause voluntarily returned to the police station and gave an 
unsigned confession, confession ruled admissible because the defendant's voluntary 
return rendered confession sufficiently attenuated from illegal arrest). 
327 See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443. 
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may admit illegally obtained evidence if the evidence inevitably 
would have been discovered through independent, lawful 
means.328 
Finally, even if no exception to the exclusionary rule 
applies, the government may use illegally obtained evidence in 
contexts outside of the prosecution's case-in-chief.329 The 
prosecutor may introduce tainted evidence in federal civil tax 
proceedings, habeas proceedings, grand jury proceedings, civil 
deportation proceedings, parole revocation proceedings, and at 
a defendant's sentencing hearing.330 
All of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule would apply 
with equal force in this context, for to hold otherwise "would 
reject logic, experience, and common sense."331 However, logic, 
experience, and common sense would similarly be insulted if 
courts were to continue to allow prosecutors to subvert 
congressional intent by allowing kingpin drug dealers to avoid 
the more severe sentencing laws under the veil of substantial 
assistance. 
CONCLUSION 
Substantial assistance as promulgated by Congress is not 
the problem. The problem lies with the prosecutor's use of the 
sentencing authority granted to him. Permissible prosecutorial 
discretion does not extend to defying congressional intent by 
favoring more culpable drug-trafficking conspirators with 
substantial assistance. 
Unlike civil or criminal defense counsel, the prosecutor 
does not represent an individual client.332 Nor does the 
prosecutor represent the victim of the crime, the police, or any 
other person.333 Instead, the federal prosecutor represents the 
vast interests of the federal government, which means he 
328 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988) (noting inevitable 
discovery is actually an extrapolation from the independent. source doctrine; since the 
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent 
source, it should be admissible ifit inevitably would have been discovered). 
329 Deters, supra note 292, at 1227. 
330 [d. 
331 Nix, 467 U.S. at 444. 
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represents the interests of society m general. 334 
Notwithstanding the prosecutor's primary obligation to the 
public, he must remember that the criminal defendant is a 
citizen and entitled to total fairness during the prosecution.335 
Viewed this way, the prosecutor has a duty not only to 
obtain a conviction, but also to seek justice.336 When 
prosecutors abuse the discretion granted to them by Congress 
to enforce the federal sentencing laws by rewarding kingpin 
drug traffickers with substantial-assistance departures, they 
jeopardize a criminal defendant's right to due process and fair 
trial and act contrary to their role as enforcers of the law.337 
334 [d. 
335 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that as the 
representative of a sovereignty whose interest in a criminal prosecution is not to win, 
but to accomplish justice, the prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness and vigor ... 
[b]ut, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones"); Secunda, 
supra note 137, at 1267·68 ("[T]he ... prosecutor strives to maintain an upright stance 
in the stained halls of criminal justice .... Virtue is the cherished ingredient in his role 
... Daily, the ethical fibre of the prosecutor is tested - and through him, in large 
measure, the rectitude of the system of justice.") (quoting H. Richard Uviller, The 
Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71 MICH. 
L. REV. 1145, 1145 (1973». 
336 For an articulation of the prosecutor's role in the criminal justice system, see R. 
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address Delivered at the Second Annual Conference 
of United States Attorneys, April 1, 1940: 
There is a most important reason why the prosecutor should have, as nearly as 
possible, a detached and impartial view of all groups in his community. Law 
enforcement is not automatic. It isn't blind. One of the greatest difficulties is of 
the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases, because no prosecutor 
can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives complaints .... What 
every prosecutor is practically required to do is select the cases for prosecution 
and to select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the 
greatest, and the proof the most certain. If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his 
case, it follows that he can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous 
power of the prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, 
rather than the case that need to be prosecuted. With the law books filled with a 
great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at least a 
technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is 
not a question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the 
man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then 
searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on 
him. It is in this realm - in which the prosecutor picks some person whom he 
dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some group of unpopular persons and 
then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse of prosecuting power 
lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime 
becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group, being 
attached to the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the 
way of the prosecutor himself. 
(quoted in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727·28 (1988) (Scalia, dissenting). 
337 See Finklea, supra note 83, at 983 ("It is well settled that the government cannot 
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They venture beyond their role as enforcers of the law and 
legislate by acting contrary to the intent of the sentencing laws. 
The separation-of-powers doctrine is adequate to deal with 
the abuse. When prosecutors use substantial assistance in 
contravention of congressional intent, separation-of-powers 
principles, as enforced through the exclusionary rule, have the 
greatest ability to correct the abuse and further the integrity of 
the federal sentencing system as Congress intended. Under 
such circumstances, exclusion provides a disincentive for 
prosecutors and preserves judicial integrity by removing 
potentially perjured testimony. 
Adriano Hrvatin* 
deliberately user perjured testimony or encourage the use of perjured testimony, so the 
great incentive to lie in the face of an offer of leniency should cause the prosecutor to 
refrain from making such a deal lest he risk punishment for causing the perjury 
himself.,,) (quoting Napue v. United States, 360 U.S. 264, 269·70 (1959». 
* J.D. candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2002. I thank the Law 
Review for the opportunity to contribute, in a small way, to a dynamic discussion in 
which much has been proposed but very little accomplished. For Richard A Canatella, 
whose passion as a student of the law I admire and in whom I find faith and 
inspiration. And for Nilo Seghetti, my grandfather, whose absence I feel with every 
beat of my heart, the heart in which his memory now lives. 
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